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Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 15 View

(MoeMaKa, June 16, 2025):

The CRPH’s Controversial CDM Law

On June 13, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) announced the promulgation of a new law titled the “Civil Service Law Relating to the Nonviolent Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)”, which outlines how CDM civil servants will be recognized and honored, and how non-CDM civil servants may face disciplinary action.

The law, which spans 11 pages and 7 chapters, includes sections on:

  • Recognition

  • Honors and awards

  • Compensation and reparations

  • Truth-seeking and justice

  • Disciplinary action

  • Appeals

  • The establishment of an investigative commission

  • And general provisions

With over four years having passed since the coup and since the resistance shifted heavily toward armed struggle, this law raises a critical question:
Does the CDM still play a vital role in dismantling the military dictatorship today?

The CDM movement, launched in the early days of the coup, was a mass nonviolent campaign aimed at shutting down the junta’s governing machinery. Just three months later, the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed, and soon after, the People’s Defense Force (PDF) was established. Since then, nonviolent urban resistance has been largely overshadowed by the military struggle, especially in areas under junta control.

At this stage, with the revolution focused on armed resistance and the goal of establishing a federal democratic union, some observers find it confusing that the CRPH would choose now to emphasize CDM in a legal framework.

This raises the question: Has the CRPH misunderstood or overlooked the fact that CDM was one phase of a broader revolutionary process? Was it a deliberate or unintentional misreading of the situation?

Originally led by health and education workers, and later joined by police, soldiers, and other civil servants, CDM participation had high momentum early in the coup. But as the political landscape evolved and new phases of the revolution emerged, it is unclear why the CRPH now deems it necessary to legally punish non-CDM civil servants.

The law explicitly defines CDM participants as those who joined the civil disobedience strike between February 1 and April 30, 2021. That narrow timeframe may exclude those who joined later, leading to further concerns about classification and fairness.

One point worth spotlighting is whether this law is effectively creating a designated identity group—those officially labeled as CDM civil servants—within the revolution. This draws comparisons to how “the 88 Generation” was defined after the 1988 uprising. Just like “monks of the 2007 Saffron Revolution,” or “1990 elected MPs,” such naming conventions can unintentionally lead to division and categorization within broader movements.

This raises the concern that CRPH, over four years after the coup, may now be reinforcing identity distinctions among revolutionaries.

Another key critique of the law is that differentiating CDM vs. non-CDM civil servants risks turning into political litmus testing—a tool to measure ideological loyalty. While resistance groups are still trying to persuade military personnel to defect, this law threatens civilian staff with punishment for not joining CDM. Such contradiction could undermine public unity and weaken morale.

Practically speaking, the majority of civil servants affected by this law still work under junta-controlled ministries. The law, therefore, targets individuals currently outside the resistance’s jurisdiction—raising doubts about its enforceability.

After the law’s release, civil society groups responded:

  • The All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) issued a statement harshly condemning the law

  • The GSCN coalition criticized it as anti-organizing, calling instead for inclusivity toward non-CDM workers

On the other hand, some CDM participants expressed support on social media, believing that those who sacrificed pay, position, and security for CDM should not be treated equally with those who stayed. These comments reflect personal grievances, not national policy.

For a legislative body like the CRPH—charged with drafting the laws of a future democratic Myanmar—long-term unity and reconciliation must be paramount. Laws based on momentary emotion risk creating permanent divisions.

Finally, we must ask whether this legal approach promotes cohesion or leads to further polarization in an unfinished revolution.