The Nuclear Spark to Place on ASEAN’s Table (Part 6 – Conclusion) by Theo Zaw
MoeMaKa, June 1, 2025
Under the 2008 Constitution, cabinet members could not be nominated directly, but once appointed, the Minister of Defense was considered a member of the NLD government. Therefore, when referring to an NLD-era minister who may have known about Myanmar’s nuclear program, that person would be former Lieutenant General Sein Win (Army No. 14682), who served as Defense Minister. He is also currently the chairperson of the Central Executive Committee of the Military Veterans’ Association. That doesn’t mean he was involved in the nuclear program—but he would likely have known about it.
Why is this significant? As previously noted, Lt. Col. Sein Thein Win earned a master’s degree in missile engineering in Russia. Others studied nuclear disciplines. Upon returning, they submitted project proposals to the Defense Services Science and Technology Research Department, according to what Lt. Col. Sein Thein Win told VOA.
At that time, the department head was none other than Lt. Gen. Sein Win, who would later become the Defense Minister under the NLD government. That’s why he is mentioned here as someone who may have had direct knowledge of the nuclear program. Other senior generals could also know, but he is singled out here because his name can be openly associated with the topic.
In any investigation, physical evidence and credible witnesses are key. After Myanmar’s then-Defense Minister declared in the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue that Myanmar had suspended its nuclear program, questions still lingered about whether the program continued quietly.
If we want to uncover the truth, we need to locate the actual nuclear reactor sites and associated facilities. It’s not easy—but we can try to reconstruct them based on available evidence. And we must pay attention to signs of North Korean involvement. North Korea has a track record of exporting nuclear technology.
On September 6, 2007, a lesson was taught when Israeli airstrikes destroyed a nuclear facility being built in Syria. Though rumors swirled quickly, it wasn’t until March 21, 2018—eleven years later—that Israeli Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz officially confirmed the strike. Since then, nuclear facilities visible from space are under closer surveillance.
Taking that lesson seriously, it’s reasonable to assume that any major nuclear facility in Myanmar may have been built underground. This aligns with Myanmar’s known emphasis on secrecy. Consider the underground bunkers of Naypyidaw and the secrecy of the military headquarters.
This isn’t just theory anymore. For instance, VOA’s interview with Lt. Col. Sein Thein Win mentioned a technical battalion referred to by locals as the “Nuclear Battalion,” officially known as the Tatmadaw Science and Technology Research Battalion No. 1 (TSTB-1). The name itself reveals the purpose.
It’s believed to be located near Twin Ngai village, an area that has endured repeated airstrikes. If this nuclear research unit was housed among the military bases in that area, it would be no surprise. Highly sensitive information and radioactive materials may be stored there.
These kinds of locations, such as TSTB-1, are now potentially within reach of resistance forces. The opportunity to expose the nuclear program that generations of Myanmar’s military leaders have kept secret may now be within sight.
To clarify, this discussion concerns clandestine nuclear activities—not the peaceful nuclear projects managed under IAEA frameworks by Myanmar’s civilian Atomic Energy Department.
If secret reactors or labs already exist, one might wonder what purpose the newly publicized Russian nuclear deal serves. It could be a distraction—akin to pretending to buy a pill press to cover up counterfeit pill production. This kind of bait-and-switch tactic is not unheard of.
Even if Myanmar didn’t produce nuclear weapons, possessing unregistered radioactive materials and developing facilities without IAEA oversight poses grave international risks.
In short, the purpose of reviving this “nuclear spark” is to alarm regional actors—especially ASEAN—into action. Though hard to prove with definitive evidence right now, we believe it’s important to pursue every lead, armed with past reports accepted by agencies like the U.S. DOJ and DEA.
The future of Myanmar lies in the hands of its people and its revolution. At the same time, those working to internationalize Myanmar’s plight must continue pressuring ASEAN to distance itself from the military junta and search for new diplomatic strategies.