Theo Zaw – The Fire on ASEAN’s Lap (Part 4)
MoeMaKa, May 23, 2025
Myanmar’s Pursuit of Nuclear Technology: Russia and North Korea in the Spotlight
Myanmar’s ambitions to acquire nuclear technology in the 2000s were focused on two key countries — Russia and North Korea.
Although announcements of agreements with Russia for nuclear reactor development surfaced in 2002 and 2007, these deals later fell apart. Despite Russia and China maintaining close ties with Myanmar’s military leadership, both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and members of the IAEA, which imposes certain international obligations — unlike North Korea, which is less bound by such norms.
Comparing Russian and North Korean Cooperation
Although Russia was mentioned often, it’s believed that the actual technology transfers and components for nuclear development were more freely facilitated through North Korea. Even if Russia cooperated, it would have done so under tighter restrictions and oversight, unlike North Korea, which operated more openly in the black market.
Revisiting Myanmar-North Korea Relations
Official diplomatic ties between Myanmar and North Korea were resumed in 2007, but observers believe informal cooperation had already existed before that. The economic struggles North Korea faced in this period — as evident in GDP contractions reported by the Bank of Korea — increased the likelihood that Pyongyang would seek foreign exchange by illicit means, including secretive nuclear transactions.
According to EarthRights International, Myanmar’s military regime had earned close to $8 billion from a single jade enterprise between 2000 and 2008 (an unofficial figure). This potentially gave them the financial means and incentive to pursue nuclear ambitions on the black market.
Indicators of Myanmar-North Korea Nuclear Links
While early-stage cooperation is possible, there is little evidence of substantial progress in Myanmar’s nuclear development at that time. The opacity surrounding North Korea’s nuclear exports makes direct confirmation difficult, but the timeline and leaked media reports suggest covert deals may have occurred. Evaluating the level of Myanmar’s nuclear capacity during 2000–2010 requires looking at both available evidence and what was realistically achievable.
Media Investigations and Whistleblowers
DVB and Al Jazeera broadcasts, including a June 4, 2010 documentary, highlighted evidence strong enough to cancel a planned trip to Myanmar by U.S. Senator Jim Webb. A key informant was Major Sai Thein Win, a graduate of the Defense Services Technological Academy, who defected in early 2010 and disclosed details of Myanmar’s nuclear efforts.
He was part of the first wave of Myanmar engineers sent to Russia, and he received a master’s degree in missile engineering from Bauman Moscow State Technical University. He had served as deputy manager at production facilities in Pyin Oo Lwin and Myingyan.
Key Focus Areas: Uranium Enrichment and Reactor Construction
Major Sai Thein Win described Myanmar’s plans to develop both uranium enrichment (using methods like Laser Isotope Separation) and to construct a nuclear reactor. These efforts were ambitious and lacked sufficient equipment or technological expertise.
Robert Kelley, a former IAEA inspector, produced a report corroborating parts of these claims. He noted that Myanmar’s reliance on advanced but impractical techniques like Laser Isotope Separation — a technology still under experimental development globally — raised questions about feasibility.
The Complexity of Uranium Enrichment
Natural uranium contains 0.7% U-235, which must be enriched for use in weapons. This is a difficult, costly, and technically complex process. The second-generation gas centrifuge method — used by North Korea — is now the most common. Earlier methods, such as electromagnetic isotope separation, are largely obsolete.
Myanmar reportedly planned to use an advanced technique, but Kelley and others expressed doubt that the country had the capacity to implement such a cutting-edge process.
UN Sanctions and Limitations
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1874 (2009) imposed expanded sanctions on North Korea and warned other countries, including Myanmar, against violating international non-proliferation obligations. By 2010, it was apparent Myanmar hadn’t received enriched uranium technology, but it had certainly been trying to acquire it between 2000 and 2010.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s military leaders clearly made sustained attempts to pursue nuclear technology — possibly deceiving ASEAN, the IAEA, and international observers in the process. It’s time to shed more light on these earlier developments to better understand the country’s long-term ambitions and current trajectory.