Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 27 Viewpoint
MoeMaKa, May 28, 2025
The Junta’s Faltering Frontlines and Areas of Temporary Military Recovery
Following major losses in 2024—losing base after base, town after town—the junta has entered mid-2025 with a mixed battlefield map. In some regions, junta offensives have stalled, while in others, it has begun launching counteroffensives in an attempt to regain lost territory.
One example is the recent offensive into Hpakant, where junta forces tried to reclaim territory. Similarly, in Chin State, a column of around 800 troops has reportedly advanced from Kalay toward the Chin hills, aiming to retake strategic camps near Thantlang and the road to Tedim.
Strategic Pressure Points: Taung Kham and Shan Fronts
In Taung Kham, a key corridor between northern Shan State and central Myanmar, the junta has reinforced with troops, air strikes, and drones. After months of resistance from local forces, they have managed to recapture some villages, shifting the momentum in that specific front.
In Kayin State, although border outposts remain under threat, the junta has attempted counteroffensives near Myawaddy and Kawkareik. Meanwhile, Lashio in northern Shan State was handed back to the junta not through fighting, but via a negotiated handover from the MNDAA under Chinese pressure.
Kachin and Upper Myanmar Fronts
In Kachin State, junta forces continue to lose ground. The months-long battle for control of Bhamo and Strategic Command Base 21 remains unresolved, with the junta on the defensive. However, in Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay regions—the resistance strongholds in Upper Myanmar—there has been no major shift in territorial control. Junta columns occasionally probe the area, but unlike in 2022–2023, large-scale campaigns have slowed.
In Mandalay’s Madaya Township, some PDF-controlled villages have reportedly been retaken by junta troops.
Region-by-Region Status
In Rakhine, the junta has suffered serious losses to the Arakan Army (AA), while in Kachin it faces continued resistance from the KIA. In Kayin and Tanintharyi, the KNLA continues attacks but hasn’t yet captured major towns. In contrast, the junta has reclaimed Thandaunggyi, which it lost to the PNLA last year. In Kayah State, Loikaw is now under junta control, and KNDF/KA offensives have quieted.
After losing Falam in Chin State, the junta has begun offensives toward Thantlang and Tedim. In Magway’s Pakokku, Myingyan, and Yesagyo, PDFs control some rural areas, although there have been no major recent losses or gains.
Fragmentation of the Northern Alliance
Since signing a ceasefire with the junta in early 2025, the MNDAA has ceased hostilities. The TNLA continues fighting alone, a far cry from the unified offensive of the initial phases of Operation 1027. This disunity is not solely due to Chinese pressure—it also stems from conflicting interests among ethnic armed groups as they consolidate control over territories.
Lessons from Operation 1027
There is an urgent need for a strategic reassessment among resistance forces. Questions must be raised about whether the goals of the NUG and those of the ethnic armed organizations align. Where do their visions differ? What role should the National Unity Government play going forward?
To effectively challenge military dictatorship, these forces must revisit the Operation 1027 experience and adjust their strategy to build a more unified political-military coalition for the next phase of the revolution.