The Fuse That Must Be Lit Under ASEAN (Part 5) – By Theo Zaw
MoeMaKa, May 29, 2025
You may have noticed that this series has been circling around Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions, which ultimately failed to reach their goal between 2000 and 2010.
The sequence of events leading from the Myanmar defense minister’s 2012 statement at the Shangri-La Dialogue that the country had abandoned its nuclear program, to the discovery of weapons-grade plutonium in the possession of “Ebisawa,” strongly suggests that secret activities continued even after that date.
If there had been hesitation in drawing firm conclusions before, this development helps underline that successive military leaders were untruthful and unbothered by violating international treaties. This writing takes a firm stance from that perspective.
Recently, Thai Member of Parliament Kannavee Suebsang (Fair Party), who has frequently criticized the Myanmar junta, raised concerns about a possible nuclear reactor construction under the military regime. If neighboring countries and ASEAN member states are beginning to worry, that is no surprise—and it’s something everyone should pay attention to.
It’s also necessary to bring up the revelations of the late Professor Desmond Ball. He was a professor at The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and led the department from 1984 to 1991. Even U.S. President Jimmy Carter once praised him for advising on avoiding nuclear war during the Cold War.
Ball had a keen interest in Myanmar. An article he co-authored with journalist Phil Thornton in the Sydney Morning Herald (August 1, 2009) about Myanmar’s nuclear secrets predated the DVB–Al Jazeera investigative report (2010).
In that article, Ball cited interviews conducted during a two-year investigation in Thailand. One interviewee was a former DSA (Defence Services Academy) officer who studied in Russia in 2000 (likely from weekly intake 41 or 42). The other was an English-speaking executive officer referred to as “Htoo Trading Co.”
According to the article, those interviews confirmed that by 2007 Myanmar’s generals had already set the wheels in motion. The article also mentioned that a uranium purification plant had been built in Thabeikkyin using Russian machinery, and satellite photos from 2007 revealed storage tanks consistent with Yellowcake (U3O8)—a precursor material in uranium processing.
Yellowcake was also a key piece of evidence presented in the U.S. Department of Justice’s case against “Ebisawa.” Interestingly, VOA had also interviewed a nuclear project advisor in Myanmar—U Thein Oo Phoe Saw—who said in a January 13, 2013 interview that “we are still trying to produce uranium oxide, known as Yellowcake, but it’s not yet successful.” He also stated that thorium could be found in the same regions as the famed Mogok rubies.
Thorium was among the radioactive materials “Ebisawa” was accused of attempting to illegally sell. While some may try to deny military involvement in these materials, it’s implausible that such operations could occur without the military’s knowledge or participation.
Notably, U Thein Oo Phoe Saw gave that interview after Myanmar’s 2012 defense minister had told the world the program was suspended. Since the nuclear program lacked transparency, only those involved would know whether these continued activities fell within IAEA-permitted frameworks.
Another striking detail from Ball’s reporting was the claim that Myanmar had constructed at least one nuclear reactor—possibly with North Korean assistance. The location suggested was Naung Laing near Pyin Oo Lwin, Mandalay. The article speculated that the name “Naung Laing” might have been planted by intelligence agencies as disinformation to conceal the true location.
With such secrecy, it’s difficult to pinpoint exact sites. Analysts must rely on indirect evidence, much like when I previously wrote about secret bunkers under Naypyidaw and was criticized for speculating on YouTube. However, after the recent Sagaing earthquake, BBC’s coverage of military command bunkers being affected lends some credibility to the existence of underground facilities.
Some facilities are said to be so secret that even senior generals and ministers are denied access. One former Union Minister under Thein Sein reportedly faced disciplinary action after investigating such a site without permission.
Reading Ball’s article makes it clear that Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions may be even more deeply hidden than suspected. And if there’s one person who likely knows more than most about this program, it might be a former NLD minister.
(To be continued)