Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 26 Viewpoint
MoeMaKa, May 27, 2025
The 2025/2026 Election and a Nation at a Crossroads
There is little dispute that the upcoming 2025/2026 election planned by the military junta will not provide a solution to Myanmar’s political crisis.
Since the beginning, the coup itself marked a breakdown in democratic order, and the differences among stakeholders now lie in how to undo this illegitimate seizure of power.
The NLD and the Coup’s Origins
One of the main opposition forces is the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the majority of seats in the 2020 general election. The military coup occurred on the morning the new parliament was due to convene, blocking the NLD from forming a government. The military justified the coup by alleging fraud in the 2020 vote and promised a new election—but four years later, instead of delivering on that promise, the country has descended into civil war. The opposition blames the military for all the consequences.
Why the Junta is Pushing an Election Now
More than four years later, the junta appears determined to proceed with elections—not to restore democracy, but to legitimize itself with neighbors and ASEAN partners who still engage with the regime diplomatically. Despite the reduced territory under its control and the lack of political freedom to organize campaigns, the junta hopes the election will provide a cover of legitimacy.
Some ASEAN nations have said that a ceasefire must come before elections. Western countries have outright rejected the junta’s plans, saying both the coup and any election it holds are illegitimate. They have called for the release of political prisoners like Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint and for an end to violence. The junta, however, has ignored these demands.
Ethnic Armed Groups and Self-Determination
Some ethnic armed groups have seen the post-coup turmoil as an opportunity to advance long-held goals like self-rule or confederation status. For many of them, the election is irrelevant. Instead, they’re focused on maintaining military control over territory.
NUG, CRPH, and NUCC Positions
The National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) reject the military’s proposed election, holding firm that any vote under the junta cannot be credible. They criticize political parties preparing to participate and warn they risk being on the wrong side of history.
These represent the strategic thinking of both exile forces and some domestic resistance groups.
A Flawed Process from the Start
The upcoming election, slated for late 2025 or early 2026, is widely viewed as neither free nor fair. The Union Election Commission is handpicked by the junta, and there are serious doubts about its neutrality or independence. Even compared to the 2010 election—which was also tightly controlled—there is little improvement in process or credibility.
Some political groups that have registered with the junta’s election commission, and others that function without official registration, seem to hope the election might reduce conflict or bring a ceasefire—but these hopes may be misplaced.
Risk of Further Fragmentation
The lack of unity among resistance groups, the absence of a coordinated political-military alliance, and conflicting interests among armed factions raise concerns. As junta-controlled territory continues to shrink, disputes over newly liberated areas could lead to infighting among resistance forces.
It’s essential to avoid new multi-sided conflicts. While central control is not the goal, all democratic, anti-authoritarian forces need to unite under a common aim: to build a federal, democratic Myanmar that rejects all forms of dictatorship.
The Road Ahead
If they fail to do so, the risk is that some leaders and groups may prioritize their own interests, negotiate separate deals with the junta, and break ranks—splintering the movement and prolonging authoritarian rule.