Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 18 Viewpoint
MoeMaKa, May 19, 2025
Residency and Work Permits in Armed Group-Controlled Territories
After Myanmar gained independence from British colonial rule, the government initiated administrative registration systems for residents. Following the 1962 military coup, the state began differentiating legal rights in education, economic activity, and social affairs based on citizenship status. In 1982, a new Citizenship Law was enacted, officially classifying individuals into three categories: citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen.
One notable example was that under these regulations, university applicants whose parents included a foreigner were barred from pursuing certain professional fields like medicine or engineering—highlighting discriminatory restrictions under the 1982 law. This law has been widely criticized, particularly for its impact on the Rohingya population in northern and western Rakhine State.
Although rights organizations called for revisions after the 2012 communal violence, neither the Thein Sein government nor the NLD government under Aung San Suu Kyi made significant efforts to amend the law. However, following the 2021 military coup and during the ongoing Spring Revolution, broader consensus has emerged that the 1982 Citizenship Law should be reformed in a future federal democratic state.
These developments reflect Myanmar’s long-standing immigration control, legal frameworks, and the historical legacy of identity-based governance.
New Residency Restrictions in Rebel-Controlled Zones
Now, in areas seized and controlled by armed resistance groups, new residency control policies are being implemented. In territories under the control of the Kokang armed group MNDAA, such as Laukkai and Chinshwehaw, restrictions are reportedly being imposed on Burmese-speaking outsiders and non-local residents.
Since the capture of towns like Chinshwehaw and Laukkai during Operation 1027, reports indicate that non-local Burmese speakers have been pressured to register for residency permits—or, in some cases, have been expelled altogether. Around the time of the Thingyan festival in April 2025, after MNDAA’s withdrawal from Lashio, similar policies emerged in areas like Chinshwehaw, Kwanlon, and Laukkai. Residency now requires approval or sponsorship from local Kokang business owners.
Likewise, in TNLA-controlled territory, local news outlet Shwe Phi Myay reported on May 17 that the group is preparing to issue residency permits or state-level registration for residents. During Operation 1027, TNLA captured 12 towns and has since been setting up governance structures, including immigration control.
This move marks the beginning of a de facto administrative framework by ethnic armed organizations, asserting their own governance in areas they militarily control. But this raises serious concerns: Will these systems become a form of ethnic exclusion? Will non-local ethnic groups be treated fairly?
Long-Term Implications and Broader Questions
As MNDAA and TNLA begin enforcing these policies, it opens the door for questions about how immigration and residency will be handled in other ethnic territories—such as those controlled by the Rakhine, Kachin, or Chin resistance movements.
Currently, the measures appear focused on security concerns, but over the long term, these groups may establish formal policy frameworks and administrative codes. The question is whether such frameworks will uphold non-discriminatory principles, or replicate older exclusionary practices based on ethnicity or language.
As Kokang and Ta’ang groups take the lead in implementing population control measures, other ethnic resistance groups in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and elsewhere may soon have to define their own immigration and civil registration policies—intentionally or by necessity.
This could become a pivotal test for the future of federalism in Myanmar. Will local governance be inclusive and rights-based, or will it fall into ethnic exclusivism?