Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 25 Viewpoint
MoeMaKa, May 26, 2025
Can ASEAN’s Peace Initiative Succeed?
In the months following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, ASEAN convened a summit and invited the junta leader, resulting in the widely referenced “Five-Point Consensus” agreement. However, over four years later, the military regime has yet to effectively implement the agreement.
Although the junta leader nodded in agreement at the April 24, 2021 summit, he later criticized the consensus, arguing that it was imposed without consultation. He claimed that only once stability returned could the Five-Point Consensus be enacted—effectively sidelining the agreement. As a result, ASEAN decided to bar Myanmar’s political appointees from participating in its high-level meetings, allowing only non-political representatives such as civil servants or directors-general to attend.
In the wake of the major earthquake in central Myanmar at the end of March, ASEAN’s restrictions were briefly relaxed. Foreign ministers from Malaysia and Thailand visited Naypyidaw, citing humanitarian concerns, and shortly afterward, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim met with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in Thailand. That meeting, combined with a subsequent online discussion between the Malaysian PM and the NUG Prime Minister, suggests a renewed ASEAN effort to facilitate dialogue.
Sources now indicate that Malaysia, as ASEAN chair, may send a delegation to Naypyidaw in the coming weeks to follow up on proposals from the NUG and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) raised in April. The goal may be to discuss ceasefire possibilities or broader peace talks with the junta.
ASEAN’s Unique Approach
Unlike the U.S. or Western countries, ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar does not rest on rigid democratic or human rights standards. Rather, ASEAN tends to focus on finding a mutually acceptable political compromise among relevant domestic actors.
Two ASEAN member states—Thailand and Malaysia—are directly impacted by Myanmar’s instability through refugee flows, arms trafficking, and cross-border insurgency. Thus, their stake in Myanmar’s internal conflict is high.
ASEAN’s current push for peace is partly motivated by the reality that the civil war may not be winnable by either side. Some ASEAN states reportedly believe the junta cannot fully suppress the resistance, and conversely, the NUG and EAOs may not be able to entirely defeat the junta either. The absence of unified military or political leadership among resistance groups may be another factor informing ASEAN’s assessment.
Limitations of ASEAN’s Strategy
Given these dynamics, the big question remains: Can ASEAN truly broker a ceasefire or meaningful peace?
With both sides still pursuing outright military victory—or at least attempting to consolidate control over territory—ASEAN’s mediation may remain limited. Until there is recognition among the various actors that military victory is unlikely and that governance requires cooperation, ASEAN’s role is likely to be constrained to humanitarian diplomacy and informal dialogue facilitation.
Moreover, if the resistance factions continue to prioritize holding territory over building unified governance or military coordination, the conflict may remain protracted and unresolved. ASEAN’s initiatives may highlight the contours of the problem—but whether they can solve it remains to be seen.