Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 5 Overview
Moemaka, April 6, 2025
What Impact Could MNDAA’s Withdrawal from Lashio Have on Operation 1027?
In early January this year, under pressure from China, the Kokang armed group MNDAA and the Military Council’s Peace Implementation Committee met in Kunming, Yunnan Province. Not long after, a report emerged stating that MNDAA forces had agreed to withdraw from Lashio by the end of June. At the time, confirming the news was difficult. Sources close to the MNDAA, including some troops stationed in Lashio, denied the report.
However, more than two months later, in early April, an official order surfaced for Kokang armed units to gradually withdraw from Lashio. Not only military forces, but also administrative departments and public services like hospitals and the electricity utility began moving equipment out of the city — something that has become clearly visible in recent days.
In short, Kokang forces appear to be preparing to withdraw about a month earlier than the initially rumored May–June timeline. However, the exact terms of the agreement between the Military Council and MNDAA regarding Lashio remain unclear.
Neither of the two involved parties has made a public announcement. But it is reported that Lashio residents and civilian staff from public service departments have been informed they can relocate along with the Kokang administration to their Special Administrative Zone (1). There are also reports that former political prisoners released during a previous opening of Lashio prison may be at risk of re-arrest by the Military Council, prompting suggestions they should also flee to the special zone.
A report also states that two Wa ethnic inmates currently held in Lashio prison were released on bail guaranteed by the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
For residents of Lashio, this situation has caused anxiety — the withdrawal of MNDAA forces and the possible return of Military Council troops raises concerns about renewed armed conflict.
Since the end of June last year, intense battles to take control of Lashio caused civilian casualties in the dozens, possibly even hundreds. Artillery strikes, air raids, fires, and looting destroyed homes, businesses, and left widespread damage.
After early August, some residents cautiously returned. Now, more than seven to eight months later, they face the reality of a transition from MNDAA control back to the Military Council. There is fear that armed clashes might return, that the junta may take revenge, or that any rebuilding efforts will be destroyed again. People fear loss of life, livelihoods, and property, all over again.
Those who’ve lived through battles understand deeply how hard it is to recover from the loss of loved ones, homes, and livelihoods. As many were just beginning to rebuild, the possibility of renewed fighting has triggered widespread worry.
These fears come at a time when people are still grappling with recent trauma and hardship.
Now the question arises — how will the Northern Alliance of three armed groups, which led Operation 1027 and captured many military bases, towns, and villages, interpret the MNDAA’s retreat from Lashio? What about the PDF forces who contributed troops, or the National Unity Government and other political groups?
Does this mean Operation 1027 has effectively ended in northern Shan State? Will joint military offensives resume in the future? These are the kinds of questions surfacing now.
During Operation 1027, the Three Brotherhood Alliance declared they would continue fighting until the collapse of military dictatorship. Many people saw it not just as a campaign for northern Shan, but as an effort that would advance toward Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and the central regions of Myanmar.
However, after capturing several cities and military zones in northern Shan, the groups shifted toward securing local autonomy. Under pressure from China, ceasefire agreements were signed, and MNDAA is now withdrawing from Lashio — all of which suggests that Operation 1027 may no longer be moving forward.
This has raised questions for the many PDF groups from upper Myanmar — including BPLA, PLA, KNDF, and unnamed others — who had reinforced the operation. How do they now view the MNDAA’s decision?
Are we witnessing a collapse of the military alliance? Or will each group continue fighting within its own territory? These are critical questions.
Alternatively, it’s possible that the PDFs, KNDF, PLA, and BPLA only joined the Kokang and Ta’ang offensives in northern Shan to gain access to weapons and battlefield experience, without any formal political commitments. If so, there may be little option now but to accept MNDAA’s decision.
If that’s the case, then the MNDAA’s retreat from Lashio may simply have to be accepted — with no choice but to understand it as a strategic decision within the broader context of regional politics.