U.S. Calls on Myanmar Junta to Immediately Cease Violence; A Turning Point for the Resistance Movement

“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 23 Overview”,

published by MoeMaKa on April 24, 2025:


U.S. Calls on Myanmar Junta to Immediately Cease Violence; A Turning Point for the Resistance Movement

At a recent meeting between the United States and ASEAN held on April 22 in Siem Reap, Cambodia, a senior U.S. State Department official called on Myanmar’s military junta to immediately end violence, release unjustly detained individuals, and allow unhindered humanitarian assistance to reach those in need.

The statement was delivered by Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, representing the U.S. at the ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue.

He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to work closely with ASEAN to help Myanmar return to a democratic path, in line with the Five-Point Consensus previously agreed by ASEAN leaders.


Diminished U.S. Engagement in Southeast Asia

Compared to issues like China-Taiwan tensions and U.S.-China trade rivalry, U.S. interest in Southeast Asia—especially under President Trump’s new administration—appears limited.

Since taking office on January 20, 2025, President Trump has shown little visible interest in the region. His administration’s focus has remained on major conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war and the Gaza crisis, rather than Myanmar or broader Southeast Asia.

Outside of these priorities, discussions in the U.S. have focused on domestic and fringe topics like leasing Greenland or speculating whether Canada could become the 51st U.S. state—issues largely seen as distractions from urgent global crises.


Junta Sees Opportunity Amid U.S. Disinterest

In this environment of reduced U.S. focus, Myanmar’s military junta may see strategic opportunity. It continues to pursue closer ties with Russia, and now, increasingly, with China, which has been pressuring ethnic armed groups to halt their offensives and has played a key role in brokering recent ceasefires.

The lack of deep U.S. involvement gives the junta breathing room and diplomatic space. Under Biden, the U.S. had not been deeply engaged either, but under Trump, the disengagement is more pronounced.


Resistance Groups’ Expectations and Reality

Several anti-junta forces—including the National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed groups in the south, northwest, and north—had previously hoped for closer ties with the U.S., seeking not only diplomatic support but also material and financial aid.

While the Burma Act was approved under Biden’s term as part of the U.S. defense budget, it did not include lethal support. And although budget provisions were passed, the actual assistance has not been fully implemented and funding windows have since closed.

Under President Trump, a new Burma Act or similar aid package seems unlikely, and U.S. foreign policy now emphasizes “America First”, focusing on financial and resource-based interests, rather than diplomatic influence or military aid.


The NUG’s Strategic Dependence on U.S. Diplomacy

As the leading political entity of the Spring Revolution, the NUG has relied heavily on U.S. diplomatic support, with many of its key figures, including ministers and CRPH leaders, residing in the U.S.

With rising U.S.-China global rivalry, Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement must now re-evaluate its diplomatic strategies. The increasing Chinese involvement in Myanmar has been evident, especially as the junta turns more and more to Beijing for support.


The Lashio Turnaround: Momentum Slipping?

While the northern campaign under Operation 1027 once energized the revolution, the recent ceasefire and handover of Lashio to the junta has been viewed as a loss of momentum.

As China’s role deepens and U.S. visibility fades, it’s becoming clear that international dynamics are shifting. The U.S. State Department’s latest statement in Cambodia, while firm, is largely seen as diplomatic posturing without substantive follow-through.


Conclusion: Resistance Strategy Needs Adjustment

As global priorities shift and Myanmar’s geopolitical reality changes, resistance leaders—including the NUG—must now rethink international engagement strategy, adapt diplomatically, and prepare for a world where China has more influence and the U.S. less resolve to intervene.

The Spring Revolution faces a pivotal moment, not only on the battlefield, but in the realm of international diplomacy. Without recalibrating, they risk being sidelined in the evolving global order.\