Myanmar’s Earthquake and the Politics of Disaster

“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 24 Overview”,

published by MoeMaKa on April 25, 2025:


Myanmar’s Earthquake and the Politics of Disaster

As the armed conflict in Myanmar enters its fourth year with no end in sight, the powerful 7.7 magnitude earthquake centered in the Sagaing region caused widespread destruction—from Sagaing and Mandalay, stretching southward to Pyinmana, Naypyitaw, Taungoo, and eastward as far as Inle Lake.

Among the casualties were displaced civilians who had fled to Mandalay from the conflict zones in northern Shan and Kachin States, as well as IDPs from Karenni (Kayah) State, Moebye, and Pekhon, who had settled in the Inle-Nyaungshwe area.

The deaths of those who had already been displaced by war, only to perish in the earthquake, reflect the multi-layered suffering of Myanmar’s people. The disaster not only revealed the human cost but also created political consequences—some subtle, some direct. Analysts and political commentators are now discussing how the earthquake has been used, interpreted, or politicized by different actors.

Some frame the earthquake as a “political rupture” mirroring the seismic shift of the country’s ongoing crisis. Veteran journalist Bertil Lintner argued that the disaster has deepened China’s grip on Myanmar, accelerating its influence.


Junta Leverages Earthquake Diplomacy

Even before the quake, the junta had planned to attend the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok, an annual meeting of South and Southeast Asian countries. Despite parts of Myanmar being declared emergency zones, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing still attended the summit in mid-April.

Using the earthquake as diplomatic leverage, he secured humanitarian engagement with regional leaders. His presence in Bangkok allowed him to meet ASEAN leaders in side meetings under the pretext of discussing aid—but in reality, it helped the junta break through nearly four years of diplomatic isolation.

Soon after, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who currently chairs ASEAN, also held a direct meeting with the junta leader, signaling a shift in ASEAN’s approach.

This has allowed the junta to present itself as a legitimate actor to some in the international community, even using the upcoming 2025 elections as a talking point during these meetings.


How Did the Resistance Respond?

The question now arises: if the junta used the earthquake to its advantage, did the resistance—NUG, PDFs, and EROs—respond effectively?

To their credit, the NUG quickly declared a unilateral ceasefire days after the quake. Although some NUG-affiliated troops and the junta did not fully honor it on the ground, the move allowed the NUG to seize political momentum and be seen as acting responsibly.

Afterward, the junta made a similar announcement, and several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Northern Brotherhood groups followed suit. The UN urged all parties to extend the ceasefires, though clashes—including airstrikes and town assaults—have continued in various areas.


Why the Junta Still Controls Earthquake Aid

Although NUG and resistance forces now control an estimated 80% of Myanmar’s territory, most of the cities hit hardest by the earthquake—like Mandalay, Sagaing, Naypyitaw, Pyinmana, Pyawbwe, Pyin Oo Lwin, and Kyaukse—are under junta control.

Because of this, most international humanitarian missions must coordinate with the junta, making it the default point of contact for aid delivery—even if not the most legitimate.

While the NUG and PDFs have provided some local relief in resistance-held areas of Mandalay and Sagaing, the worst-hit towns were not within their jurisdiction, and therefore did not attract the same level of attention or media coverage.


Recovery Begins Amid War

Now more than three weeks after the quake, Myanmar has shifted from emergency response to recovery and reconstruction. Civilians in quake-hit zones—already burdened by war—must now rebuild amid overlapping crises.

For the NUG, PDFs, and EAOs, the coming phase is critical. They must focus not just on military success but also on helping civilians recover, both physically and emotionally.

“There is a first phase of winning battles, a second phase of holding territory, and a third—perhaps most difficult—phase: serving the people.”

If they can ease the suffering of quake survivors, they may win a deeper kind of legitimacy, proving that their revolution is truly for the people.