“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 27 Overview”,
published by MoeMaKa on April 28, 2025:
From Territory Loss to Counteroffensive: Junta’s Rebound and the Resistance’s Need for Unity
After the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) in April 2021, the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) were established about a month later. The NUG, built upon the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) along with representatives from other revolutionary groups, ethnic organizations, and strike committees under the NUCC (National Unity Consultative Council), quickly expanded its resistance framework.
Nearly four years later, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and NUG-aligned PDFs now control around 90 townships and large swaths of territory. However, of Myanmar’s 330 townships, more than 200 remain under junta control.
The Impact of Operation 1027
Following the launch of Operation 1027 on October 27, 2023, resistance forces captured numerous towns, army bases, and key border trade routes. In Northern Shan State, the junta’s movements were effectively blocked.
In the second phase of Operation 1027, the resistance gained even more ground, dealing the junta heavy defeats on the eastern, northwestern, and northern fronts.
However, China’s growing concerns over its regional interests—fearing either total junta collapse or fragmentation—led Beijing to pressure Myanmar’s armed groups toward a ceasefire, altering the political and military landscape.
The Shifting Dynamics
It remains unclear whether the Northern Brotherhood Alliance foresaw China’s policy shift. Some analysts believe China initially supported Operation 1027 to suppress border instability but grew alarmed when the ethnic forces gained too much power.
While the first phase of Operation 1027 was partly justified as a “crackdown on illegal activities,” the second phase evolved into a broader territorial conquest campaign, culminating in the capture of Lashio—a move that triggered China’s diplomatic intervention.
China’s pressure eventually led to ceasefire negotiations and the handover of Lashio back to the junta, signifying a critical turning point in the campaign.
The Junta’s Counteroffensive
With support from China, the junta began regaining its footing:
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Pressuring Kokang forces (MNDAA) into a ceasefire (January 2025)
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Reducing frontline losses in northern Shan
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Halting the momentum of Operation 1027
Now, the junta has shifted to counteroffensives:
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Attempting to retake Naungcho in northern Shan
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Launching attacks in Hpakant (Kachin State)
Compared to the second half of 2024—when it was reeling—the junta has now survived its worst moments and averted immediate collapse.
A Warning for the Resistance
In mid-to-late 2024, towns like Pyin Oo Lwin and Mandalay were nearly threatened. Now, the junta has stabilized.
For the resistance, this period signals a need for urgent political and military coordination:
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Strengthen alliances beyond temporary military partnerships
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Forge deeper political agreements between NUG, PDFs, EAOs, and Northern alliances
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Formulate a coordinated national strategy rather than isolated regional offensives
What’s at Stake
If the resistance forces fail to unify and coordinate, the junta may:
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Rebuild its strength
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Launch new offensives
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Regain previously lost territories
The momentum gained through the Spring Revolution and Operation 1027 could slowly erode unless proactive steps are taken.