Earthquake and Relief Efforts in Myanmar

Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 7 Overview
Moemaka, April 8, 2025

Earthquake and Relief Efforts

As of now, the death toll from the powerful earthquake that struck Myanmar’s Sagaing region on March 28 has risen to 3,600, with over 5,000 injured and 160 still missing—a number that many believe could be even higher in reality.

Following the quake, several neighboring and international countries sent in professional emergency rescue teams, search equipment, and sniffer dogs. Their efforts significantly boosted Myanmar’s limited domestic capabilities in emergency response and technical operations, helping with rescue missions that local teams alone could not have handled effectively.

Now, the critical emergency rescue phase has ended. Some international rescue teams have already departed Myanmar. However, bodies remain trapped under collapsed buildings in various locations, and recovery efforts are still ongoing in some areas, often combined with the clearing of debris.

With the worst of the casualties now evident, the country is moving into the recovery phase, focusing on providing shelter, food, and rebuilding livelihoods for earthquake survivors.

The quake caused massive damage to both modern and ancient buildings, including cultural heritage sites. Among the worst-hit were multi-story residential buildings, condominiums, hotels, and high-rise housing, especially in Mandalay, which bore the brunt of the destruction. Second to Mandalay, significant damage was reported in Sagaing City across the river and in Naypyidaw, the administrative capital established around 2006, as well as in Pyin Oo Lwin.

On the relief front, many governments, both regional and international, responded swiftly with aid directed toward the people of Myanmar—regardless of the country’s political situation. Even countries like Malaysia and Singapore, which have been critical of the military regime, prioritized humanitarian needs and provided support to the affected public.

By contrast, the United States, which has consistently criticized the military junta since the 2021 coup, announced only $2 million in aid and did not send emergency rescue teams. This stance reflects the Biden administration’s broader policy of focusing more on domestic affairs than international humanitarian crises.

During this rescue period, the military junta did not visibly deploy its troops for civilian rescue operations. Instead, while international teams were searching for survivors under the rubble, the junta focused on swiftly clearing and rebuilding parts of Mandalay’s historic palace walls—a clear indication of skewed priorities, where symbolic infrastructure was prioritized over saving lives.

Aside from calling for international aid, the junta made no significant coordinated effort to manage emergency operations effectively. Even in Naypyidaw, families of civil servants affected by the quake were seen living in makeshift roadside shelters with inadequate food, water, and sanitation—signs of poor internal support and planning.

More than ten days after the earthquake, Myanmar is now transitioning from emergency rescue to the reconstruction phase. This raises several important questions:

  • How will the junta manage and distribute the aid received from international donors?

  • How much can local communities in quake-affected regions expect from either the junta or international organizations to rebuild their lives?

There are also concerns about how UN agencies and international governments will manage aid funds. Most foreign governments prefer to route aid through international NGOs or UN agencies like the United Nations, rather than directly through the junta. In some cases, semi-government bodies like the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) may act as intermediaries.

Observers and independent media have also begun questioning whether this aid might end up in the pockets of the military or be diverted for military campaigns. Others worry that funds might be misused for political gain, particularly in relation to upcoming elections where junta-aligned parties might exploit aid as part of their campaigns.

These concerns cannot be completely dismissed—but neither can they be confirmed without further evidence. Monitoring how aid is used has become the responsibility of civil society and the independent press.

In a city like Mandalay, which suffered some of the heaviest damage, the process of rebuilding is already highlighting inequalities across economic classes. Mandalay is not just an economic hub of Upper Myanmar—serving as a center for agriculture, trade in gold and gemstones, and even illicit economies like narcotics—but also the base for large-scale trading with China and for the processing of crops like tea from northern Shan State.

While some wealthy businesspeople may have the resources to recover, middle- and lower-income households will struggle much more to rebuild. In addition to long-term residents, many displaced people from conflict-affected regions like Kachin, Chin, northern Shan, and Sagaing have sought refuge in Mandalay and are now also among those impacted.

Compared to places like Sagaing, Pyin Oo Lwin, Kyaukse, Tada-U, Pyawbwe, Wundwin, and Myittha, Mandalay has relatively stronger capacity to recover. But for towns more deeply affected by both war and earthquake, the dual challenge of conflict and reconstruction will make recovery particularly difficult.