Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 6 Overview
Moemaka, April 7, 2025
Earthquake and Politics
The devastating earthquake that struck Myanmar’s Sagaing region on March 28—an event that could be called a national catastrophe—has sparked broad questions about how different actors responded to the crisis and how the disaster has been politically leveraged. From preparedness and warnings by scientists before the quake, to immediate government response, rescue efforts, and allocation of international aid, the earthquake has become tightly interwoven with the country’s ongoing political crisis.
Did the authorities pay attention to scientific warnings about the earthquake risk? After the quake struck, how effective was the government in responding? Were rescue and relief efforts equally distributed across all affected areas? Did armed conflicts pause to prioritize humanitarian work? How did the international community’s emergency assistance get handled? How did those responsible for administering the affected areas manage the crisis? And finally, how might this natural disaster impact the military junta’s plans for elections later this year or early next year—and its standing in international diplomacy?
Most of the areas hardest hit by the earthquake—including Naypyidaw, the administrative capital—are under the control of the military junta. Some villages in Sagaing were in territories controlled by the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG). The highest casualties and destruction occurred in urban zones with multi-story buildings. In such places, foreign governments typically reached out to the military junta directly to offer assistance. Countries with already strong ties to the junta—like China, India, Russia, and Thailand—were quick to make contact and offer aid, along with some other regional neighbors.
Even countries critical of the junta, such as Malaysia (currently ASEAN Chair), responded swiftly with emergency humanitarian assistance. Singapore also sent rescue teams. Meanwhile, the United States, under its new administration, has shown diminished interest in Myanmar’s crisis. It announced only a small amount of humanitarian support—surprisingly limited—despite its historic support for Myanmar’s democracy movement. This noticeable retreat in U.S. involvement has disappointed the NUG and those depending on Western backing for democratic change in Myanmar. The way the Biden administration’s policies on Myanmar have unfolded—especially revealed through this earthquake response—signals a shift in U.S. positioning.
On the other hand, China emerged as the most prominent international responder. It sent the largest number of emergency relief teams and the greatest volume of aid among all nations. This response helped improve China’s image among the Myanmar public, reducing some of the existing mistrust and skepticism toward Beijing.
Politically, the disaster brought certain benefits to the junta. China’s pressure on the Kokang MNDAA to withdraw from Lashio around the same time as it provided earthquake assistance could be seen as a calculated move to temper anti-China sentiment.
Shortly after the quake, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing attended the BIMSTEC summit in Thailand, where he met separately with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other regional leaders. This marked the highest-profile diplomatic engagement the junta has managed in the past four years. Following the summit, the foreign ministers of Thailand and Malaysia even visited Naypyidaw—developments that, while not signaling the full end of diplomatic isolation, did undermine the degree of diplomatic distancing under the guise of humanitarian assistance.
Beyond foreign relations, the earthquake also exposed glaring issues in the junta’s internal administration. In Naypyidaw, several ministry offices and civil servant housing complexes were severely damaged. Reports indicate that the junta prioritized protecting military offices and headquarters over civilian safety. Some ministerial buildings became unusable, while staff housing collapsed, causing fatalities and delays in rescue operations. For days after the quake, civil servants and their families were seen living under makeshift shelters along roadsides with inadequate food, water, and sanitation. These experiences are likely to erode morale and trust in the junta’s administrative system.
In smaller towns, emergency aid was slow or insufficient. As the rescue phase comes to an end, the country now faces the challenge of reconstruction. In areas like Sagaing, Mandalay, Kyaukse, Pyin Oo Lwin, Taungoo, and Inle Lake, communities may have to begin rebuilding largely on their own. In regions still affected by armed conflict, rebuilding efforts and war-time displacement will now intersect, compounding the burden.
Ultimately, the political fallout of the earthquake is still unfolding. How the earthquake influences the trajectory of armed conflict and political control remains unclear. But it is already evident that the quake has become not just a natural disaster—but a politically significant moment that may reshape both domestic governance and international diplomacy.