“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 28 Overview”, published by MoeMaKa on April 29, 2025:
After the Return of Lashio: Mounting Pressure on TNLA
Following the MNDAA’s ceasefire agreement with the junta in January and their handover of Lashio in April, there is now growing pressure on other armed groups in northern Shan State, particularly the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army).
During late 2023 and early 2024, the rapid collapse of junta positions—military bases and towns—in northern Shan surprised not only the junta but also many political and military observers. As losses mounted in Rakhine and northern Shan, the junta faced serious doubts about its survival, while the resistance forces experienced a surge in morale.
However, the January ceasefire agreement between the MNDAA and the junta, followed by the handover of Lashio, has cooled the momentum of further territorial advances and damaged solidarity among allied resistance groups.
The MNDAA’s decision effectively signals that it no longer intends to expand territory, and the junta can concentrate its military resources elsewhere—particularly against the TNLA.
TNLA Under Renewed Pressure
Over recent weeks, fighting around Taung Kham south of Naungcho has intensified. The junta’s forces, previously in defensive positions, have now shifted to offensive operations, gradually advancing toward Naungcho.
Reports indicate junta forces have captured villages such as Meibot and Naung Lin near Taung Kham, bringing them within 15–16 miles of Naungcho town.
Given that the junta reclaimed Lashio without a fight, it is now likely to target Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw for recapture in a step-by-step campaign.
The Junta’s Strategy in Northern Shan
While the junta continues defensive retreats in Rakhine, the Irrawaddy Delta, and Bhamo (Kachin State), in northern Shan, it appears to be attempting a counteroffensive—using Chinese diplomatic cover and support.
China’s growing involvement suggests that the junta will focus on regaining key trade routes and towns along the Myanmar-China border.
TNLA’s Difficult Position
Since the start of Operation 1027, the TNLA has expanded its territory significantly, controlling areas not only populated by Ta’ang communities but also mixed regions like Kutkai, Naungcho, and Mogok.
However, as the balance of forces shifts—with less backup from the MNDAA and BPLA—TNLA’s position is now more precarious. Tensions have also been reported between different ethnic groups in newly captured territories, reducing unity compared to the early stages of Operation 1027.
The presence and cooperation of PDFs (People’s Defense Forces) from Sagaing, Mandalay, and southern Shan, which were prominent during earlier battles in places like Kwanlon and Laukkai, now seem less certain.
Fragmented Resistance?
Questions are now being raised:
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Is the alliance between EAOs and PDFs that existed in late 2023 still intact?
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Can the PDFs continue to support battles like those at Taung Kham and Naungcho?
Some reports suggest small PDF units like DPLF (Dhanupyu People’s Liberation Force) are still active in northern Shan, but broader coordination appears weakened.
What’s at Stake
If TNLA and its allies fail to consolidate their gains, the junta—with China’s diplomatic and material support—may regain lost border trade routes and towns, reestablishing a degree of control in northern Shan.
The battle for northern Shan is now at a critical point. Resistance groups must balance their territorial ambitions with political and alliance-building priorities—accepting that holding territory and building partnerships are not always simultaneously achievable.