Myanmar Spring Chronicle – March 21 Scene
MoeMaKa, March 22, 2125
The Shift in Military Power Balance in Northern Shan Due to Chinese Pressure
On October 27, 2023, Operation 1027 began, and nearly a year later, in October 2024, the Kokang armed group MNDAA managed to capture several areas in northeastern Shan State. These areas included not only the Kokang Self-Administered Zone under the 2008 Constitution but also places in northern Shan such as Hseni, Mong Ko, parts of Kutkai Township, and Lashio—the headquarters of the Northeastern Military Command. Additionally, the MNDAA attacked and seized Hopang and Panlong, territories controlled by the Wa Self-Administered Region, before handing them over to the United Wa State Army (UWSA) within a few days. The military successes exceeded initial expectations.
Similarly, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) launched offensives and captured towns including Namkham, Namhsan, Mantong, Mong Ngaw, Mong Lon, Namtu, Naungcho, Kyaukme, Moekok, Mongmit, Kutkai, and Hsipaw, achieving more than anticipated. These were the military outcomes led by two armed groups in northern Shan. Meanwhile, in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) also conducted successful operations, capturing all but two townships in Rakhine and even seizing the headquarters of the Western Military Command.
During the first eight months of Operation 1027, the three allied armed groups, known as the “Northern Brotherhood,” achieved continuous military victories. However, after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw in mid-August, China’s policy towards Myanmar shifted, affecting domestic military movements—particularly in northern Shan State. This led to increased pressure for a ceasefire and for the MNDAA to withdraw from Lashio.
Reports of a planned MNDAA withdrawal from Lashio by the end of June emerged alongside news that the MNDAA and the military junta had agreed to a ceasefire in January. However, the MNDAA did not make any explicit statements on the matter. Following the January 18 ceasefire agreement, airstrikes on MNDAA-controlled Lashio, Hseni, and Laukkai ceased. Later, under Chinese pressure, TNLA and the junta met in mid-February, but the meeting only resulted in an agreement to hold further discussions rather than any concrete resolution.
In March, reports surfaced that representatives from the MNDAA and the junta, who had met in January, would hold another meeting in Kunming, China, on March 22. Speculation arose about whether the discussions would involve more detailed negotiations over MNDAA’s withdrawal from Lashio. Some unverified reports also suggested that certain MNDAA troops had already started moving from Lashio toward Hseni.
In recent days, there was also a protest in Lashio. Protesters displayed messages opposing MNDAA’s withdrawal, rejecting a return to military junta control, and expressing dissent against China’s pressure. The fact that such demonstrations occurred under MNDAA control raised questions about whether they had been permitted or even encouraged by the group itself.
During both the first and second phases of Operation 1027, alongside the TNLA and MNDAA, armed groups from Shan, Karenni (Kayah) State, and various People’s Defense Force (PDF) groups also took part in the fighting. While it is confirmed that these groups were involved, media sources have not clearly detailed the scale of their participation, whether they fought alongside the Northern Brotherhood to access weapons and ammunition, or if they believed that a united offensive was the best strategy for defeating the junta. It is likely that both reasons contributed to their involvement.
Other armed groups, including the PDF forces, the PLA faction formed by the Burma Communist Party, the BPLA led by Maung Saungkha, and the Danubyu People’s Liberation Army, also engaged in battles in northern Shan. The loss of junta-controlled territory in Shan North may present opportunities for armed groups in the central regions like Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay, as well as open new logistical routes between ethnic resistance territories.
However, after securing territories, some defense forces later shifted back to their original strongholds or moved to the upper regions like Sagaing. Now, after nearly a year and a half of Operation 1027, the offensive momentum has slowed. The junta, with arms and technology acquired from China and Russia, has intensified efforts to retake lost towns and territories. Recent reports indicate that TNLA has lost some of its strongholds in the Tangyan region.
These shifts in military balance may weaken the momentum of the joint anti-dictatorship offensive. Despite these developments, local populations who have fought and sacrificed for their land will not easily accept its loss or forced withdrawal. Whether through armed resistance or nonviolent opposition, the unwavering determination of the people fighting for liberation from military rule remains a crucial factor in this ongoing struggle.