Myanmar Spring Chronicle – February 10 Overview
MoeMaKa, February 11, 2025
Min Tat PDF Announces Fundraising for Returning Residents; Latest on Tiger Farms in Myawaddy and Three Pagodas Pass
Min Tat, one of the first towns to launch the armed Spring Revolution, was recently seized from the military council by the Min Tat PDF, a member of the Chinland Joint Forces. Following this takeover, residents are now allowed to return and resettle in the town. However, the Min Tat PDF has announced that returning residents must provide proof of financial contributions to the resistance movement. If they have not previously contributed, they must make a donation before being granted permission to reside in the town.
The public announcement did not specify the required amount of financial contribution. At the town’s entry gate, individuals must either present a receipt of prior donations or make a contribution on the spot to gain entry, as stated by the Min Tat People’s Administration.
Min Tat, like other conflict-affected towns, has suffered significant damage due to artillery shelling and arson by the military council’s forces. Many residents have lost their homes and livelihoods over the years, making it difficult for some to meet the fundraising requirements.
Southern Chin State, compared to other ethnic regions and the rest of Myanmar, has fewer natural resources and lacks major trade routes. Consequently, tax revenues from commercial activities are limited, which may be a reason for such fundraising measures.
After the military council was driven out, interim governance structures were established at the township, district, ward, and village levels. However, setting up a fully functional civilian administration remains challenging. Armed resistance groups are not only engaged in combat but also taking on administrative responsibilities, which is not a sustainable long-term approach. Although they control the territory, active battles continue, raising concerns about governance structures and the potential for extended rule under armed groups.
Since the coup, civilians have faced significant hardships, including displacement, loss of homes, food shortages, and economic instability. The armed groups must acknowledge these struggles and provide solutions that do not further burden the population.
Crackdown on Tiger Farms in Myawaddy and Three Pagodas Pass
Another pressing issue is the crackdown on tiger farms in Myawaddy and Three Pagodas Pass, which has drawn significant public attention.
In recent months, China has increased pressure on Thailand to take action against illegal tiger farms. As a result, Thailand has escalated enforcement measures, including cutting off electricity, fuel supplies, and other essential goods to these operations. Despite not being based within Thailand, these farms have relied on cross-border trade to access power, internet, and IT equipment. The Thai government fears that its reputation and tourism industry could be damaged due to its indirect association with the illegal wildlife trade.
Although Myanmar’s military junta has publicly distanced itself from the Border Guard Force (BGF) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which are allegedly involved in these operations, it has made limited efforts to address the issue. However, to appease China, Myanmar has taken steps to cut off fuel supplies to Myawaddy, signaling cooperation with Beijing’s demands.
Observers are closely watching how much pressure Thailand can exert on BGF and DKBA, as well as what enforcement actions it might take. Corruption within the Thai military, police, and intelligence agencies has likely played a role in the growth of these tiger farms. However, the full extent of their involvement remains unclear.
Since these tiger farms are operated by criminal organizations, the armed groups providing them protection are likely complicit in their activities. While they claim to receive only land rental fees, many suspect they benefit from substantial profits. Up until mid-2024, Myanmar’s military had maintained a strong presence in the region, making it unlikely that it was unaware of these operations. Now that it has lost full control over Myawaddy, the military may see this as an opportunity to distance itself from any involvement.
Lastly, while the Myanmar junta handed over Kokang leader Phe Sauk Chain to China, it does not have the same leverage over Saw Chit Thu, the leader of BGF. In the coming weeks, attention will focus on whether Thailand intensifies its pressure on BGF and DKBA and what actions it might take.