Myanmar Spring Chronicle – December 17 Overview
MoeMaKa, December 18, 2024
No Remarkable Results in Talks Between China’s MNDAA and Myanmar Military Council
Shortly after the visit of KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) Chairman General N’Ban La to Yunnan Province, China, last week, representatives of the MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army), including the son of its leader, and military council delegates led by Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo held ceasefire discussions in Yunnan Province, China, on December 15-16.
Unlike KIO, which was invited as a guest for discussions without coercion, China’s approach to MNDAA seemed to include pressure, urging the group to negotiate directly with the military council on military issues, including ceasefires and the return of territories and towns seized by MNDAA forces. This distinct treatment highlights China’s differing attitudes toward various ethnic armed groups along its border with Myanmar, implying a clear hierarchical or preferential stance.
While China maintains a relatively hands-off approach with KIO/KIA, it seems to exert more pressure on MNDAA, pushing for a ceasefire and a withdrawal from captured towns, particularly to reopen trade routes.
Although there was no official statement or media release about the outcomes of the 2-day talks, sources close to the discussions reported that the military council demanded MNDAA retreat from Lashio and reopen the northern Shan State trade route. Additionally, they requested the release of detained military council officers and personnel. On the other hand, MNDAA reportedly pushed for official recognition of the territories they seized, including Lashio, as part of Kokang’s self-administered zone, a term used since the 1990s for Special Region 1.
The military council insisted that MNDAA withdraw from Lashio as a precondition for further negotiations, and both sides agreed to reconvene in January. This marks the first major discussion following the second phase of Operation 1027.
China was reportedly displeased with MNDAA’s seizure of Lashio, as evidenced by the meeting between UWSA (United Wa State Army) leaders and China’s special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun, in late August in Yunnan Province. This meeting underscored China’s concerns about the consequences of Operation 1027 for northern Shan State’s military landscape.
China remains wary of growing relations between ethnic armed groups and Western nations while also worrying about the increased territorial control of these groups. Such concerns have led China to adopt new policies toward Myanmar since August, including border gate closures, trade restrictions, and economic pressure on ethnic armed groups and local communities.
China’s policies toward Myanmar are primarily driven by its national interests. As with any powerful nation, China prioritizes stability in its neighboring regions to avoid potential threats or becoming a geopolitical battleground. This includes maintaining stable relations with whichever government holds power in Myanmar—military or democratic.
The 1027 offensive in late 2023 posed risks to China’s major infrastructure projects, such as oil pipelines, deep-sea ports, special economic zones, and the rail project connecting Yunnan’s Kyaukphyu Port. In response, China has sought to de-escalate the conflict and pause the momentum of Operation 1027.
China’s involvement in facilitating talks between the military council and ethnic armed groups reflects its strategic priorities in border stability, economic interests, and political influence. Whether these discussions will yield concrete results remains uncertain, and further developments are expected in the coming months.