Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 21 Perspective
(MoeMaKa) November 22, 2024
In Southern Shan State, the military junta has initiated certain offensives and is preparing for further operations in potential regions
Following the second phase of the “Operation 1027,” which began in late June this year, there are indications that the military council is preparing to reclaim some areas in Southern Shan State, Karenni territory, and other regions it lost during the campaign.
Recent reports suggest junta troops are regrouping and mobilizing around Moine and Tant Yan. Military activities aimed at retaking areas controlled by Mandalay-based PDFs in Madaya Township, and offensives around Loikaw and nearby areas in Karenni State, have been observed. Clashes have also been reported near areas under the control of PNLA forces around Si Saing Township.
In Northern Shan State, the military council faced a significant defeat when it lost its Northwestern Command Headquarters near Lashio in late July to early August. Over three months have passed since the loss of this strategic headquarters. The military is now using Moine as a base and appears intent on reclaiming Lashio to re-establish its Northwestern Command there.
In recent days, a Kokang rebel leader reportedly received treatment at a family-owned hotel in China’s Yunnan Province. Reports suggest Chinese authorities detained or restricted them, allegedly linked to efforts to pressure MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) to retreat from Lashio. Although China denied the detention claims, emphasizing it was merely medical treatment, it is evident that China has been exerting pressure on MNDAA to halt military operations and return some territories.
China’s actions have also extended to Kachin State’s eastern areas, Northern Shan State, and parts of Eastern Shan State. Measures include restricting resources, trade, and arms supplies to ethnic armed groups, aiming to force ceasefires or territory concessions.
The military junta appears to be capitalizing on these developments, considering the embargo an opportunity to launch counteroffensives in previously lost regions. Recent actions include targeting PNLA-controlled areas in Southern Shan State, in coordination with PNO forces, and launching offensives in zones such as Si Saing and Pon Chaung starting November 20. The PNLA has reported airstrikes on key areas, including the Pon Chaung Bridge.
Concurrently, the military continues efforts to regain control over territories held by Mandalay-based PDFs in Madaya Township, as reported.
Amid these developments, the junta is reportedly benefitting from diplomatic and economic support from China, including during high-level meetings such as the Mekong-Lancang Summit. This support has bolstered its capacity to prepare for new offensives.
For those fighting against the junta’s authoritarian rule—whether armed groups or political entities—reassessing their policies and relations with China is becoming increasingly critical. Strategic discussions and decisions on engaging with China’s role in Myanmar’s conflict are urgently needed.