Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 24 Snapshot
(MoeMaKa) November 25, 2025
U.S. Suspension of TPS for Burmese Nationals and Its Myanmar Policy
Just a few days ago, a committee of the U.S. Congress held a hearing on Myanmar under the title:
“A Strategy with No Exit: Myanmar’s Endless Crisis and America’s Limited Options.”
At this hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Myanmar experts testified that the U.S. response to Myanmar’s civil war and the military junta has been inadequate and ineffective. Members of Congress also raised questions and shared their own critical views.
At a time when many were hoping that this hearing might trigger a policy shift on Myanmar, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced on November 24 that it would end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Burmese nationals who had been allowed to stay in the United States under that program.
In its announcement, the department justified the decision by claiming that conditions in Myanmar had improved:
that the military had lifted the state of emergency, that the country was preparing for free and fair elections, and that ceasefire agreements had been reached with ethnic armed groups. On that basis, it argued there was no longer a need to extend TPS.
According to U.S. government figures, around 3,900 Burmese nationals are currently residing in the U.S. under TPS. Most originally arrived on tourist visas, work visas, or student visas and then remained under TPS. Countries granted TPS typically include places facing civil war or extreme instability, and Myanmar was added to that list by President Biden after the military coup of February 1, 2021.
The impact of this decision is not only on those 3,900 individuals; more importantly, it signals the U.S. government’s broader stance on Myanmar.
No matter how strongly the Congressional committee may have criticized the junta or debated Myanmar policy in recent days, the reality is that the Trump administration is looking primarily at U.S. interests and is effectively treating Myanmar as a country that will “soon return to peace and normalcy.”
If we recall that, under President Trump, the federal government only just narrowly avoided a prolonged shutdown after more than a month of deadlock over the budget, it is clear that Congress’s influence and room for maneuver are quite limited.
For President Trump, a country like Myanmar – a Southeast Asian state that does not carry significant weight for U.S. strategic or economic interests – is hardly a priority. This is the same president who has:
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spoken in ways that directly challenge the sovereignty of close allies like Canada and Mexico, and
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imposed higher tariffs on Western European allies,
all in the name of protecting American interests first.
In this context, the TPS decision is further proof that we cannot expect strong, sustained U.S. support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement under Trump. Hopes that the recently announced U.S. task force on cracking down on Southeast Asian cyber-scam syndicates might somehow translate into deeper involvement on Myanmar have also proven unrealistic.
The U.S. may indeed move to suppress cyber-scam crime networks, but that does not logically lead to serious action against Myanmar’s military dictatorship. There is no real basis to conclude that confronting the scam gangs will naturally evolve into a robust policy to hold the junta to account.
For Myanmar’s democratic forces and revolutionary forces, this means one thing:
when it comes to our internal struggle, we must rely first and foremost on our own strength.
We cannot continue to imagine that great powers will sweep in, isolate and dismantle the “villain camp” for us. The situation has reached a point where we must stop entertaining that illusion and recognize that our liberation will depend primarily on our own organization, sacrifice, and resilience, not on external rescue.