Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 14 Overview
(MoeMaKa, November 15, 2025)
Tensions Rise Between MNDAA and the Military; Hsipaw–Lashio Road Closed
Tensions have erupted once again between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), based in Kokang, and the military junta — just months after their ceasefire agreement. The dispute reportedly centers on territorial control requests made by the junta, which MNDAA rejected. In recent days, both sides have imposed travel restrictions, closing the Hsipaw–Lashio and Mong Yai–Lashio roads.
The first visible sign of tension was the closure of the bridge in Hsipaw, located on the Mandalay–Lashio–Muse Union Highway, where both sides blocked traffic across the river, effectively cutting the route. Reports have also emerged of military activity near Hoya village, close to Lashio, indicating that the situation is worsening.
Following the junta’s recapture of Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw earlier this year, it managed to reestablish control as far as those towns and is now reportedly trying to extend dominance over the strategic trade and military corridor running from Hsipaw through Theinni and Kutkai. The MNDAA and junta had met frequently in Lashio since their January ceasefire, discussing ground-level changes and local disputes. According to some reports, another meeting took place as recently as November 11.
Unofficial sources claim that the junta has demanded MNDAA withdraw its troops from the Hsipaw–Lashio area by November 20, but MNDAA has refused.
After the military recaptured Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw from TNLA control between July and October, the junta reopened the Mandalay–Lashio Union Highway. Along the Hsipaw–Lashio road, MNDAA had maintained checkpoints, collecting tolls and conducting inspections. The junta’s recent maneuvers suggest an effort to fully reclaim control over this stretch of road.
Recently, the junta reached a ceasefire agreement with TNLA, which included TNLA’s withdrawal from Mogok and Momeik and a halt to airstrikes. After securing this deal, the junta appears intent on reestablishing military stability in northern Shan State.
Both MNDAA and TNLA seem to have divided responsibilities under their respective ceasefire agreements — with the ethnic armed groups allowed to retain certain towns and zones, while the military gradually consolidates elsewhere. For the junta, the 2024 ceasefires provided a breathing space to reassess its strategy, manpower, and weapon systems after major defeats during Operation 1027.
Since early 2025, the junta has launched a counteroffensive — recapturing Naungcho in July, followed by Kyaukme and Hsipaw in October. These regained territories boosted military morale, prompting the junta to pressure MNDAA to withdraw from the Hsipaw–Lashio corridor.
The junta likely believes MNDAA and its allies no longer possess the military strength they once had during Operation 1027, when joint Brotherhood Alliance offensives — backed by the UWSA’s weapons and funding — inflicted massive losses on the regime. Now, with Chinese pressure curbing UWSA’s support, the junta sees an opportunity to test MNDAA’s resolve.
Whether the junta’s calculation proves correct remains to be seen. If fighting resumes, it is uncertain whether MNDAA could again receive reinforcements or supplies from its previous allies. During Operation 1027, groups such as the KNDF, PLA, BPLA, and numerous PDF battalions from central Myanmar supported the Kokang offensive. Today, such coordination seems far less likely.
Moreover, the UWSA, once a key logistical partner, is now under tight Chinese scrutiny and unable to provide open assistance — making a repeat of 2023’s alliance-driven offensives far more difficult.
Another critical issue is trust between northern ethnic allies and central PDFs. Many PDF groups felt betrayed or excluded when the Brotherhood Alliance pursued separate ceasefires earlier this year. These developments damaged confidence and unity, leading to perceptions that some ethnic forces prioritized their own interests over the broader revolutionary cause.
The junta is now poised to exploit these fractures. As trust and solidarity weaken among allied forces, the military regime gains opportunities to divide, isolate, and reclaim territory.
Ultimately, each ethnic armed group continues to prioritize its own political and territorial interests first — while the shared revolutionary objective of defeating the junta and establishing a federal democratic union remains secondary.
Without a common political understanding or unified command, these internal divisions continue to be one of the greatest weaknesses of the Spring Revolution.