Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 5 View
(MoeMaKa) November 6, 2025
Tax Abuse, Crimes by Some Fighters, and the Spring Revolution
In areas called “liberated zones”—towns and territories seized from the military and held by armed resistance groups—there have been a trickle of reports about financial misconduct while administering taxation and justice: misuse of funds, abuses of power, human-rights violations ranging from “smaller” infringements to the gravest cases of extrajudicial killings. Such reports especially come from regions outside the traditional EAO-controlled areas—for example, the central dry zone, Yaw and Saw areas, and Tanintharyi in the far south.
In recent days, news emerged from Kanbalu Township that a tax official and staff members were arrested and investigated for embezzling tens of millions of kyats. It is believed they forged receipts and seals and siphoned off tax revenues. Kanbalu, in Sagaing Region along the Mandalay–Myitkyina highway, like many places in Sagaing, is rich in resources such as timber and gold—so tax collections there can bring in substantial revenue.
A few months earlier in Kani Township (Sagaing), 13 members of the local “Pa-Thone-Loan” committees—People’s Defense, People’s Administration, and People’s Security—were arrested and investigated over financial abuses. Reports said the amount involved could reach many tens of millions of kyats. Revenues in Kani include river-transport fees and levies related to timber extractions from zones such as the Alaungdaw Kathapa protected forest, where permissions were allegedly granted in exchange for taxes or “fees.”
These abuses reportedly did not begin recently; they date back over two years. Though complaints surfaced, no action was taken until certain armed battalions gathered evidence and reported directly up to the NUG leadership, prompting the current investigations.
The two cases above—both embezzlement—are from Sagaing. But issues have also been reported elsewhere. An essay dubbed “Dry-Zone Dubai” described, in oilfield areas like Myaing and Yesagyo (Magway Region), problems around management of oil-tax revenues, corruption, and the spread of illegal gambling and brothels. Publication of that essay sparked debates over whether it should have been published; some even claimed it led to airstrikes by the junta. Others argued that, as the NUG’s administrative, tax, and justice organs bear responsibility, and as the Spring Revolution was born to reject corruption, abuse of power, and rights violations, such matters must be exposed and held to account, not tolerated even “a little.”
Beyond financial abuse, there have also been serious rights violations and crimes committed by some members of resistance units. Early in the coup period, a group led by U Thaw Bar Kana (formerly Sayadaw Thapyay Aye), later nicknamed “Lt. Gen. Brahmin”, in Yinmarbin Township, was accused of killing around 20 local PDFs, volunteer firefighters, and civilians—one of the earliest grave abuses. Later, in a village in Chaung-U Township, some local defense members allegedly detained, raped, and murdered several underage girls and boys. In Saw Township, a PDF unit reportedly killed about seven people—a family and their guest—and looted property. Last year in Kanbalu, the PLF township lead and others allegedly sexually exploited detained women.
Most recently, in a village in Saw Township, a PDF member allegedly raped and murdered an underage girl and hid the body in an abandoned clinic. Locals protested, demanding the death penalty. Although the suspect has been arrested, doubts remain as to whether effective accountability will follow.
In major cases like unlawful killings and sexual violence, effective prosecution and punishment have often been absent. Officials sometimes tell the public, “It’s wartime; justice will be done after the revolution,” but this impunity risks encouraging repeat offenses.
When reviewing these reports, one notes they mostly surface from Bamar-majority dry-zone areas under PDF control. It is fair to ask whether similar abuses occur in ethnic armed groups’ territories. It would be unrealistic to say none occur there; they likely do, though perhaps in smaller numbers than in the Bamar heartland.
One reason may be that many EAOs have long-established administrations, justice mechanisms, and taxation systems—pre-dating the current Spring Revolution—and often operate with nationhood-focused discipline that differs from newly formed structures in Bamar regions.
For areas administered under the NUG, there is a need to tighten administration and justice, manage tax revenues transparently and effectively, prevent abuse, and minimize burdens on civilians.
As the armed resistance nears five years, unfolding events point to an urgent need for stronger systems, enforceable rules, and real accountability—so that the revolution’s conduct matches its principles.