Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 5 View
(MoeMaKa, July 6, 2025)
What Does the Military Council’s Offer to PDF Forces Signify? China Holds Separate Meetings with TNLA and the Junta
On July 4, 2025, approximately six months before the proposed elections, Myanmar’s military council issued a statement titled “Invitation for the Union’s Benefit.” This announcement, released by the State Administration Council’s Information Team, extended an invitation to “PDF-named groups and other armed organizations” to participate in building a federal democratic union, asserting that both the military council and these groups share this objective. The statement called for these groups to operate within the legal framework and contribute to the union’s construction.(moemaka.net)
However, the statement lacked clarity on several fronts. It did not specify whether the invitation was directed at entire organizations or individual members willing to disarm and integrate under the military council’s administration. No timeline was provided, and references to the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the National Unity Government (NUG) suggested an attempt to portray PDF groups as being misled by these entities.(reuters.com)
Notably, the statement did not mention ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), indicating a possible distinction in the military council’s approach toward EAOs and PDF groups. This suggests that the invitation was primarily aimed at PDF forces operating in central Myanmar regions such as the Dry Zone, Ayeyarwady, western Bago, and Tanintharyi.
Even if the statement was intended for PDF groups, it appears to be more of a public relations move to bolster the military council’s image ahead of the elections, rather than a genuine peace offering. Given the military’s continued refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 2020 election results and its ongoing suppression of opposition, it is unlikely that this invitation will yield significant results. While some individuals may choose to disarm and accept the offer, it is improbable that there will be a substantial impact.(moemaka.net)
The language used in the statement, with its vague references and lack of concrete proposals, resembles previous propaganda efforts rather than a sincere peace initiative.
Simultaneously, the military council has intensified its military operations in northern Shan State, particularly targeting the strategic town of Nawnghkio. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which had captured Nawnghkio on July 31, 2024, has been defending the town against renewed assaults. Despite previous ceasefire agreements brokered by China, hostilities have resumed, with the military council launching airstrikes and ground attacks in the region.
China has been actively mediating between the military council and ethnic armed groups, including the TNLA and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). While the MNDAA agreed to a ceasefire and withdrew from certain areas under Chinese pressure, the TNLA has resisted similar demands, particularly regarding the relinquishment of control over key towns along the China-Myanmar trade route. The TNLA has emphasized the importance of maintaining its positions to ensure the safety and well-being of the local population.
The ongoing conflict, coupled with China’s strategic interests and influence in the region, underscores the complexity of the situation. The TNLA faces challenges not only from the military council’s offensives but also from China’s economic and political pressures, including trade restrictions and demands for territorial concessions.(english.shannews.org, myanmar-now.org)
In conclusion, the military council’s recent invitation to PDF groups appears to be a strategic move aimed at legitimizing its planned elections rather than a genuine effort toward national reconciliation. Meanwhile, the situation in northern Shan State remains volatile, with the TNLA steadfast in its resistance against both military aggression and external pressures.