“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 5 Overview”,
published by MoeMaKa on May 6, 2025*:
The Possibility of Building Alliances to Withstand Chinese Pressure
On May 4, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) held a press briefing regarding its April 28–29 meeting with the Myanmar military junta in Kunming, Yunnan Province, facilitated under Chinese pressure.
At the press conference, TNLA publicly disclosed what both sides had demanded during the talks.
According to their account, the junta requested TNLA to withdraw from all towns it had seized during Operation 1027, including Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Naungcho, Mogok, Moemate, Namkham, and Kutkai, and to station its forces only in Namhsan and Mantong.
Strategic and Economic Dimensions
TNLA captured 12 towns during Operation 1027, including several in resource-rich regions like Mogok. Holding such towns not only strengthened their military influence but also became a source of revenue, particularly through taxation of local resources and trade.
However, the fact that multiple armed groups control different stretches of the China–Myanmar border trade route has led to Chinese dissatisfaction. Beijing reportedly signaled that if TNLA refused to withdraw, it may face border gate closures—putting TNLA in a difficult position.
Signals of Pressure and Isolation
While TNLA officially stated it has no current plans to withdraw, its tone suggests that partial withdrawals under pressure might be considered in the future.
What makes this more serious is that among the Northern Brotherhood Alliance’s three members, only two remain actively resisting the junta—since MNDAA signed a ceasefire and returned Lashio in January.
This leaves TNLA and AA (Arakan Army) to bear the full brunt of military resistance, intensifying pressure on them both.
Fraying Trust Within the Alliance
The handover of Lashio has already damaged trust among alliance members and their PDF allies. During the first and second phases of Operation 1027, the three allied EAOs and PDF units had carried out joint offensives—something unprecedented in the Spring Revolution.
But the return of Lashio was seen as undermining the momentum and compromising future coordination.
China’s Broader Aim: Full Border Stability
There is speculation that China now seeks the complete withdrawal of ethnic armed groups from the trade corridor running from Muse and Lashio to Mandalay. TNLA has not confirmed this, but media speculation suggests this is part of Beijing’s strategy.
In that context, TNLA’s press briefing appears to be a strategic move to signal to other ethnic forces—such as KIA, MNDAA, SSPP, and RCSS—that unity is essential to resist Chinese pressure.
Among these groups:
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KIA is still actively fighting the junta
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MNDAA signed a ceasefire and returned Lashio
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SSPP and RCSS are not currently fighting the military
Hence, TNLA’s message likely targeted KIA, its most active and immediate ally.
Recent Frictions Undermine Unity
Over the past few months, TNLA and KIA have clashed over checkpoint management, tax collection, and territorial control—especially near Kutkai and Namphatka.
Such tensions have sparked local discontent and required top-level discussions between the two groups, suggesting that even among anti-junta forces, internal disputes remain unresolved.
A Warning for the Resistance Movement
If control over territory and revenue becomes the primary goal—rather than overthrowing the junta—and if military victory becomes the sole standard for legitimacy, then unity will continue to erode.
This fragmentation could delay or derail the broader goal of ending military rule in Myanmar.