Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 14 Viewpoint
MoeMaKa, May 15, 2025
Strategy Behind the 2025/2026 Election
The NUG and The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) released a statement in recent days regarding the upcoming election, which the military junta has announced will be held by the end of this year or early next year. The statement primarily aims to urge registered political parties to boycott what NUCC and the National Unity Government (NUG) jointly call a “sham election.”
The NUG and NUCC emphasized that the military junta lacks the legal mandate to conduct an election and that its track record of war crimes renders its involvement illegitimate. Participating in such an election, it argues, would risk making political parties complicit in the junta’s actions.
The statement also reaffirms the legitimacy of the 2020 election results, highlighting that the elected representatives from that vote continue to stand with the people and are actively engaged in the ongoing Spring Revolution.
This raises questions about how the upcoming military-planned election differs from the one held by the former junta in 2010. That election, conducted under the 2008 constitution, was not considered free or popular at the time either.
In 2010, the NLD—the country’s main opposition party—did not participate. Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest, and the NLD’s Central Executive Committee was not in a position to function collectively. Some former NLD members formed the National Democratic Force (NDF) to contest the election separately.
Moreover, some newly formed ethnic parties also joined the race in 2010, including the Rakhine National Development Party, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (often referred to as the “White Tiger Party”), the Mon Democracy Party, and the Karen People’s Party.
That 2010 election saw widespread allegations of advance vote manipulation in favor of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), enabling it to secure power. The NLD’s non-participation further cleared the way for the USDP to dominate.
Although the 2010 election was not credible at the time, it later gained some retrospective recognition after by-elections in 2012 allowed the NLD to enter the political system. International hopes grew that Myanmar was on a path toward political transition.
Riding that momentum, the NLD won a landslide victory in 2015, and again in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the military’s 2021 coup overturned the 2020 results and derailed that trajectory.
The 2025/2026 election proposed by the junta is starkly different from 2010 in its context. It is being held amid a civil war ignited by the military’s rejection of the 2020 results. Most political forces and the general public have shown little interest in an election process that lacks legitimacy and unfolds under martial law.
Since the coup, the junta has repeatedly promised to hold new elections only after verifying voter rolls from 2020—a process that has dragged on for four years, with no real progress, while the country burns in war.
The reality is that any election held now would not be based on peace or rule of law but on pressure from foreign powers that support the junta’s normalization.
Domestically, Myanmar is still reeling from a devastating earthquake, and civilians are still being bombed. In such conditions, the so-called election would be a mere performance staged for appearances.
It’s worth asking whether NUCC and NUG have consulted with their ethnic revolutionary allies about past experiences of military-organized elections and how they have responded historically.
Over the years, the junta has tried to co-opt ethnic armed groups through elections, ceasefires, and economic deals, offering them security roles or urging them to register as political parties.
Historically, most EAOs have refused to recognize junta-organized elections. Their engagement with political parties has been minimal, usually limited to accepting the NLD as a legitimate opposition force.
If the junta’s 2025/26 election proceeds, political parties that choose to participate or collaborate—under the pretext of reform or representation—are likely to be seen as complicit. Meanwhile, the spirit of the 2020 election lives on through the Spring Revolution and the alliance between the public and ethnic resistance groups.
In essence, this so-called election is a theater of convenience for the junta and its affiliates. As NUCC and NUG stress, it will not carry Myanmar toward democratic change, but rather serve as a rerun of past manipulations dressed in new costumes.