Myanmar Spring Chronicle – December 15 Perspective
MoeMaKa, December 16, 2024
The Spring Revolution: Armed Groups, Common Interests, or Conflicting Objectives
Following the military coup in early 2021, in addition to the already-existing ethnic armed groups, many new armed groups emerged to resist and fight against the military. Alongside over two dozen pre-existing armed groups, hundreds of new formations sprang up with the goal of resisting the coup regime, capturing territories, towns, and military bases.
At present, defense forces organized by townships or districts, as well as newly-formed ethnic-based armed groups, have proliferated across the country. It would not be wrong to estimate their numbers in the dozens, if not hundreds. Some of these groups have gradually been organized under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of the National Unity Government (NUG). However, there are many groups that remain independent, partially integrated, or not fully supported by the MOD. Some armed groups operate without strictly adhering to orders or regulations, as can be seen from news reports.
The MOD’s People’s Defense Forces (PDF), often backed by NLD party leaders and elected representatives at township, district, or state levels, are also active. In addition, there are PDFs cooperating with ethnic armed groups, PDFs trained by ethnic armed organizations, and those operating under varying levels of ethnic group supervision.
In ethnic armed group-controlled areas, operations are often directed by ethnic leadership, and some PDFs function under their command. Others join battles to gain combat experience, secure weapons, or achieve specific territorial goals.
Generally, the armed resistance can be categorized into five main groups:
- Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs)
- NUG/MOD’s PDFs
- Independent PDFs
- PDFs reliant on ethnic armed groups
- PDFs operating as military units under ethnic armed groups.
Within these categories, there are both instances of cooperation and conflicts of interest. In terms of strength and territory, ethnic armed groups remain the most powerful, controlling the largest areas. The NUG/MOD-affiliated forces are the second most significant in numbers, with the other categories trailing behind.
The term Spring Revolution refers to the movement against military dictatorship, drawing inspiration from the Arab Spring uprisings of the early 2010s. In Arab countries, armed revolutions only occurred in Libya and Syria, while other nations experienced largely peaceful mass movements, some successful and others unsuccessful. More than a decade later, the situation in Syria remains unresolved, shaped by foreign arms support and shifting local conflicts, which led to the downfall of a brutal tyrant.
Myanmar’s situation raises critical questions: Are the ethnic armed groups’ aspirations for autonomy, self-determination, or even confederal status beyond the goals of the anti-dictatorship Spring Revolution? Is Myanmar’s situation as mature as Syria’s, or does it still lack the necessary cohesion and readiness?
These questions are essential to analyze and debate. Only through clear, thoughtful discussions can a timely resolution emerge for Myanmar’s crisis.
If not, Myanmar’s situation risks resembling Syria’s, where external involvement exacerbated a prolonged conflict, eventually devolving into stagnation and chaos.