Myanmar Spring Chronicle – December 13 Overview
MoeMaKa, December 14, 2024
The Possibility and Legitimacy of the Junta’s Planned Election
On February 1, 2021, following an election in which the NLD party won and was about to form the government, the military seized power, alleging electoral fraud due to inaccuracies in voter lists. Since the coup, although the military has consistently promised a new election, it has been unable to set a date even after more than three and a half years. This indicates a clear reluctance on the part of the junta to hold an election swiftly.
In the aftermath of the coup, the junta imprisoned NLD party leaders to render the party ineffective, while NLD offices across the country were destroyed. Despite the lack of widespread armed conflict at the time, the military delayed elections, citing a lack of stability and peace. Compared to the situation in late 2021 and early 2022, the current reality shows that over 80 towns and nearly entire states are no longer under military control, making it impossible to hold elections in these areas.
Recently, the junta’s election commission stated that elections could likely take place in about 160 “secure” townships. Myanmar has 330 townships in total, meaning elections would initially occur in just under half of the country, with the rest planned for when security is ensured.
Why Is the Junta Suddenly Talking About Elections in 2024?
The junta now faces significantly reduced territorial control and increasing pressure from China, the only major international player providing diplomatic and economic support. Russia, though a military ally, is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and lacks strategic interests in Southeast Asia, limiting its capacity to fully assist Myanmar’s junta.
Given China’s push for a political solution to maintain stability and safeguard its interests, the junta may feel compelled to hold elections. However, the legitimacy of such elections remains questionable.
Elections held in only half the country lack validity, especially as voting cannot take place in regions like Rakhine, Karenni, Kachin, northern Shan, and Chin States. Any planned election would therefore be partial and geographically limited. A historical comparison can be drawn to the 1951 election during the post-independence civil war under the AFPFL government, which managed to regain control of lost territories. In contrast, the current junta lacks the military strength to achieve similar outcomes.
Reactions to the Proposed 2025 Election
Domestically, political and armed resistance groups, including ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the NUG (National Unity Government), and PDF (People’s Defense Force) groups under NUG, reject the election. Their general stance is to oppose and disrupt the process. However, there are no unified strategies or directives among armed groups, with some targeting civilian officials involved in the election process, accusing them of collaborating with the junta.
In areas controlled by armed resistance forces, elections cannot be held. Moreover, civil servants, such as education officials who might be tasked with assisting the process, could face violence, detainment, or attacks.
The Role of Political Parties
Candidates representing political parties that choose to participate in the election could also become targets of armed groups. The lack of legitimacy surrounding the election raises concerns about escalating violence, killings, and terrorism within the country.
In conclusion, the junta’s planned election lacks credibility, faces logistical impossibility in half the country, and is likely to fuel further instability and conflict.