Myanmar Spring Chronicle – November 15 Overview
(MoeMaKa) November 16, 2024
Joint Security Forces Proposed by China
After the recent visit of the junta’s leadership to China earlier this month, noticeable developments affecting the armed conflicts within Myanmar have emerged. In northern Shan State, tighter restrictions have been observed at border trade gates shared between the two countries. Simultaneously, the junta has ramped up preparations to retake strategically vital territories, including Lashio, in an effort to reclaim lost ground in northern Shan State.
China’s policies and shifting strategies concerning Myanmar’s ongoing armed conflicts and political turmoil have been apparent since mid-August. Following the junta leader’s recent visit and the closure of border gates, reports indicate that China is engaging in discussions to establish joint security forces. These forces aim to protect its significant investments, such as the oil and natural gas pipelines.
There is still uncertainty about the nature of these joint forces. It is unclear whether they would function as private entities or be directly affiliated with China’s government and involve a comparable armed group from Myanmar’s side. In Western countries, private security companies operate under legal frameworks, offering services for situations where state military or police cannot intervene directly. However, Myanmar currently lacks private armed security firms to guard large-scale economic projects in conflict zones.
Although the Chinese-owned oil and natural gas pipelines connecting Kyaukphyu in Rakhine to Kunming have not been directly targeted during recent conflicts, an attack was reported on a junta military outpost assigned to safeguard the pipelines. Similarly, other Chinese investments, such as the Letpadaung copper mine, the Tagaung Taung nickel project, and the Alpha Cement Factory near Mandalay, have suffered disruptions and damages due to armed clashes. These incidents have also included temporary detentions of Chinese nationals.
Given the circumstances, China’s proposal to establish independent armed groups to protect its investments is significant. Observers anticipate that such plans may materialize soon.
The junta’s inability to ensure security for Chinese investments has created a vacuum that China appears ready to fill. This might involve deploying heavily armed and technologically advanced security forces, making it more challenging for ethnic armed groups or PDFs to counteract them.
Traditionally, Myanmar’s military has staunchly opposed external interference, emphasizing national sovereignty and rejecting foreign influence. However, the current internal conflicts and mounting losses have pushed the junta into a weakened position where reliance on China’s support—militarily and politically—is becoming inevitable.
While Spring Revolution armed groups, including the NUG and allied organizations, have not directly threatened Chinese interests, the NUG has expressed its desire for amicable relations between the Chinese and Myanmar people. Despite this, China’s government has begun to actively support and interfere in favor of the junta, providing both political and military backing.