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(MoeMaKa), July 14, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n The ASEAN chair, the Philippines, and neighboring Thailand have both reiterated that Myanmar\u2019s crisis must ultimately be resolved by the country\u2019s own stakeholders. Philippine Foreign Minister and current ASEAN Chair Enrique Manalo, along with Thailand\u2019s Foreign Minister, stressed that lasting peace cannot be imposed from outside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While this position is broadly accepted by all major actors\u2014including the military junta, the National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and other political groups\u2014the reality on the ground is far more complicated. Myanmar\u2019s key political and military actors remain deeply divided, with many unable or unwilling to communicate directly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, there has been virtually no direct dialogue between the military junta and the NUG since the 2021 coup. The junta continues to label the NUG as a terrorist organization, while the NUG considers the military an illegitimate regime that seized power by arresting the country\u2019s elected leaders. The NUG has repeatedly stated that meaningful negotiations can only begin if the military first agrees to withdraw from politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military has publicly expressed willingness to hold peace talks with ethnic armed organizations, arguing that they do not seek control of the country\u2019s central government. However, observers note that there has been little indication of genuine political compromise in those peace initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Before the 2021 coup, Myanmar\u2019s armed conflicts were largely addressed through political dialogue, particularly during the 2011\u20132020 peace process. The military takeover, however, severely undermined confidence that negotiations alone could resolve the country\u2019s conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On July 13, ASEAN foreign ministers continued their diplomatic efforts in Pattaya, Thailand. ASEAN representatives met separately with officials from the junta\u2019s National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and with several ethnic armed organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The participating EAOs were mainly groups based along the Thai border, including the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and the Chin National Front (CNF).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notably absent were several of Myanmar\u2019s most influential armed organizations based near the Chinese border, including the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Shan State Progress Party\/Shan State Army (SSPP\/SSA). These organizations generally operate under stronger Chinese influence, making them less involved in ASEAN-led diplomatic initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Following the meetings, Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo described the discussions as \u201ca good beginning\u201d during an interview with Philippine media. He emphasized that it was the first time ASEAN\u2019s special envoy had been able to meet senior representatives from several ethnic armed organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the organizations represented in Pattaya accounted for only a portion of Myanmar\u2019s more than a dozen EAOs. With the exception of the CNF, the participating groups are all active along the Thai border, making their attendance more practical given Thailand\u2019s role in facilitating the talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, powerful armed groups operating in northeastern Myanmar and Rakhine State remained outside the process. Those regions continue to be shaped largely by China\u2019s influence. In 2025, Beijing played a key role in brokering separate ceasefire arrangements between the junta and both the TNLA and the MNDAA. Even the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA), which enjoys extensive self-rule in northeastern Myanmar, is generally regarded as operating within China\u2019s sphere of influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taken together, these developments suggest that ASEAN\u2019s current diplomatic efforts, even if successful, are likely to have the greatest impact in southeastern Myanmar and parts of Chin State. The country\u2019s other major conflict zones\u2014including central Myanmar, the Dry Zone, the northeast, the north, and Rakhine\u2014remain influenced by different military dynamics and external actors, particularly China. As a result, any comprehensive solution to Myanmar\u2019s conflict will likely require engagement beyond ASEAN\u2019s current initiatives. Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from July 13 (MoeMaKa), July 14, 2026 ASEAN Envoys and Thailand\u2019s Foreign Minister Hold Separate Meetings with Myanmar\u2019s Rival Parties The ASEAN chair, the Philippines, and neighboring Thailand have both reiterated that Myanmar\u2019s crisis must…<\/p>\nASEAN Envoys and Thailand\u2019s Foreign Minister Hold Separate Meetings with Myanmar\u2019s Rival Parties <\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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