{"id":9655,"date":"2026-06-30T21:09:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-30T14:39:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=9655"},"modified":"2026-06-30T21:09:00","modified_gmt":"2026-06-30T14:39:00","slug":"conflicts-among-revolutionary-armed-groups-are-increasing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2026\/06\/conflicts-among-revolutionary-armed-groups-are-increasing\/","title":{"rendered":"Conflicts Among Revolutionary Armed Groups Are Increasing"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\"May<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from June 29<\/em><\/h2>\n

(MoeMaKa), June 30, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n

Conflicts Among Revolutionary Armed Groups Are Increasing<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In recent months, clashes among revolutionary armed organizations have become more frequent. These incidents have ranged from armed confrontations and direct firefights to sieges, raids, and the use of force to arrest rival members.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Broadly speaking, these conflicts fall into two categories:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Conflicts among ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Conflicts among non-ethnic revolutionary armed groups.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Among the EAOs themselves, some confrontations involve organizations that cooperate to some extent with Myanmar\u2019s military junta and those that do not. Others occur even without any connection to the junta. In some cases, armed organizations representing the same ethnic group have even fought one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    From a civilian perspective, it is natural to ask: if all of these armed groups oppose the military regime and share broadly similar political goals, why are they fighting each other instead of forming alliances and coordinating their efforts?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The short answer is that some groups either lack a coherent political ideology, possess only a weak political foundation, or are driven by ethnic nationalism to the point that they are unwilling to accept equal coexistence with other ethnic communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    International media covering Myanmar\u2019s civil war often describe the relationships among the country\u2019s armed resistance groups as \u201cloosely allied.\u201d Journalists who visit front-line battlefields frequently interview fighters, commanders, and civilians working under difficult conditions, such as hospital staff and teachers. When discussing relations among resistance groups, they commonly characterize them as \u201cloosely connected alliances.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This description reflects the fact that, since the 2021 coup, hundreds of armed organizations have emerged, but the political and organizational bonds linking them together remain relatively weak. Western media generally assess these alliances as fragile and lacking strong institutional cohesion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Many people in Myanmar, however, tend to view any armed organization opposing the military regime as part of a single revolutionary camp. Less attention is paid to questions such as whether these groups share the same political ideology, how their political visions differ, or whether their relationships are durable enough to sustain long-term cooperation against the junta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This broader political context helps explain why conflicts among resistance organizations have become increasingly visible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Recent tensions and clashes between the Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), as well as between the TNLA and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), are examples of conflicts among ethnic revolutionary organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    These disputes have led to changes in territorial control across northern Shan State and, in some cases, have caused previously allied organizations to suspend cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    A second category of conflict involves organizations under the National Unity Government (NUG)\u2014including the People\u2019s Defence Force (PDF) and the People\u2019s Administration\/Defense structures commonly referred to as the \u201cPa Thone Lone\u201d organizations\u2014and independent PDF or Local PDF (LPDF) groups that are outside NUG authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Earlier this year, fighting also broke out between the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA), led by Bo Nagar, and NUG-affiliated PDF and Pa Thone Lone forces. That conflict did not escalate further after Bo Nagar surrendered to the military junta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Another confrontation later occurred in Minkin Township between a student resistance force and the NUG-affiliated Minkin People\u2019s Defense Team.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    More recently, clashes erupted in Myingyan District between the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) and NUG-affiliated forces. During an operation to surround a PLA base, four people were reportedly killed after triggering landmines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Although tensions between the PLA and NUG-affiliated PDF and Pa Thone Lone forces remain unresolved, senior leaders have yet to engage in meaningful negotiations, while the conflict has not escalated into sustained large-scale fighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Even within NUG-affiliated forces themselves, internal disputes have surfaced. Last month, forces associated with the Magway Federal Unit reportedly surrounded the forces of Commander Bo Let Yar over disagreements concerning the distribution of natural resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Most recently, an apparent assassination involving members of NUG-affiliated PDF forces reportedly occurred in Pale Township, Yinmabin District.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The latest incident involved Aar Ku, a leader of the Monywa Township People\u2019s Security Organization, who was reportedly surrounded and arrested after an armed operation involving approximately five PDF battalions. According to current reports, the shooting left three members of the People\u2019s Security Organization and several civilians dead, for a total of six fatalities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The incident has raised questions about whether alternative disciplinary procedures could have been used instead of deploying multiple battalions to conduct an armed raid and arrest against a fellow resistance leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Taken together, the incidents involving the Magway Federal Unit, Yinmabin\/Pale Township, and the operation against the Monywa People\u2019s Security Organization suggest shortcomings in internal disciplinary mechanisms and command-and-control structures within NUG-affiliated armed organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    As a result, two important questions have increasingly come to the forefront:<\/p>\n\n\n\n