{"id":9253,"date":"2026-04-24T16:26:07","date_gmt":"2026-04-24T09:56:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=9253"},"modified":"2026-04-24T16:26:07","modified_gmt":"2026-04-24T09:56:07","slug":"the-coup-military-is-using-airstrikes-as-a-way-to-gain-the-upper-hand-militarily","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2026\/04\/the-coup-military-is-using-airstrikes-as-a-way-to-gain-the-upper-hand-militarily\/","title":{"rendered":"The coup military is using airstrikes as a way to gain the upper hand militarily"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"No<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from April 23<\/em><\/h2>\n

(MoeMaKa), April\u00a024, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n

The coup military is using airstrikes as a way to gain the upper hand militarily<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, the greatest daily cause of casualties and destruction has increasingly become airstrikes. In 2021 and 2022, ground fighting was the most commonly seen form of conflict. But since 2024, and up to the present, the most frequent incidents in ongoing military operations have been aerial attacks. If one looks at a map of Myanmar, daily air attacks can now be seen across the north, west, center, southeast, and south of the country. These include attacks by fighter jets, training aircraft, and military helicopters, as well as, in some areas, bomb drops from light two-seater gyrocopters and motorized gliders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking at these developments, it can be concluded that since the civil war reignited and intensified after 2021, the nature of warfare and military attacks has been changing along with conditions on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Airpower-based offensives of the kind now being used\u2014to strike enemy movements and destroy places where opponents are based\u2014were not especially common in the early period after the coup. At that time, when military bases of the coup regime came under attack, airstrikes were generally used more as retaliatory responses or as air support during intense fighting. The coup military still controlled broad areas on the ground, and air support was only called in occasionally when needed to defend those territories. Airstrikes were not yet a daily occurrence. Requests for air support had to be submitted and approved, and attacks were typically carried out only with authorization from senior generals at central command level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Later, however, as territorial losses mounted, airstrikes increasingly took on the form of near-daily operations aimed at destroying the enemy. At that stage, air support and air attacks began to be authorized at the level of regional military commanders, such as commanders of military regional commands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military has also been using air power to strike towns it has lost on the ground, rotating from one place to another, with the aim of preventing normal administration and everyday civilian life from resuming in those areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, in places such as Rakhine State, Kachin State, Karen State, and the central dry zone, towns and villages where the military has not yet been able to launch ground offensives again are being attacked in turn from the air. These attacks appear intended to reduce public trust and support for the resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations controlling those areas. Hospitals, schools, and office buildings have also been targeted and destroyed in order to prevent administration and public services from functioning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This strategy appears to have had some degree of effect. More than simply weakening public support, it has created conditions in which armed groups administering captured territories cannot establish stable governance. As a result, when pressure for ceasefires reaches a certain point, they sometimes end up accepting it. For example, among the reasons why the Kokang armed group and the Ta\u2019ang armed group agreed to ceasefires, airstrikes can be said to have been an important factor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ethnic armed organizations and resistance armed groups still do not have effective air defense systems or weapons to counter air attacks. Shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, for example, are the kind of arms usually sold only between governments, making them difficult to obtain. They are also very expensive, which makes acquiring and using them even harder. The coup military is aware of this and is exploiting air power as one of its advantages, carrying out airstrikes across the country almost every day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For resistance armed groups, the main thing they can do is organize advance warnings and encourage the construction of bomb shelters to protect civilians living in their controlled areas, as well as their own troops, from aerial attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another important issue is that resistance forces need to understand how the coup military is gathering the intelligence it needs for these airstrikes. Some attacks target places where civilians are gathered in large numbers. But in other cases, the targets are not public gatherings; rather, attacks occur very quickly after the military appears to have identified gatherings of resistance fighters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If one were to cite examples of attacks on civilian gatherings, there is the attack on Pazigyi village, and last year\u2019s attack on a Thadingyut festival in a village in Chaung-U Township. Given today\u2019s IT capabilities, it should also be noted that location data from mobile phones can be purchased either from telecom operators or from global technology data-selling firms known as mobile data brokers, and then analyzed and exploited using AI and other technologies. It is no longer necessarily the case that phone location data can only come from mobile operators. Around the world, there are technology companies that sell data collected by individual mobile apps to advertising companies, governments, and intelligence agencies, and in some international conflicts such data has reportedly been used to carry out attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the coup military has also been able to track or purchase and exploit the location data of phones used by resistance armed groups, then airstrikes could become even more dangerous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is still not known precisely to what extent these modern IT-based surveillance technologies are being used in the current wave of airstrikes. But there is little reason to doubt that they are being used to some degree.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from April 23 (MoeMaKa), April\u00a024, 2026 The coup military is using airstrikes as a way to gain the upper hand militarily In recent years, the greatest daily cause of casualties and destruction has increasingly become…<\/p>\n

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