{"id":9009,"date":"2026-03-16T21:39:35","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T15:09:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=9009"},"modified":"2026-03-16T21:39:35","modified_gmt":"2026-03-16T15:09:35","slug":"clashes-and-interpretations-surrounding-fighting-between-northern-alliance-armed-groups","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2026\/03\/clashes-and-interpretations-surrounding-fighting-between-northern-alliance-armed-groups\/","title":{"rendered":"Clashes and Interpretations Surrounding Fighting Between Northern Alliance Armed Groups"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from March 15<\/em><\/h2>\n

(MoeMaKa),\u00a0March 16, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n

Clashes and Interpretations Surrounding Fighting Between Northern Alliance Armed Groups<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In recent days, the armed conflict that has broken out between two members of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance\u2014the Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)\u2014no longer appears to be a mere accidental skirmish or minor clash at the lower levels. Instead, it has taken on the characteristics of military operations involving attacks on enemy positions and attempts to seize and control territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to statements released by the TNLA and reports from Shwe Phee Myay News, a Ta\u2019ang media outlet, the TNLA claims that it has not issued an order to open fire except in cases of self-defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the morning of March 14, MNDAA forces reportedly initiated attacks. The following day, March 15, MNDAA managed to take control of Kutkai town. Near Nam Phat Kar, on the Lashio\u2013Muse road, MNDAA troops also attacked TNLA positions. By March 15, reports also emerged that MNDAA forces were attacking the 12-mile hill position on the Nam Phat Kar\u2013Namkham road, raising speculation that MNDAA might advance further toward Namkham.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During Operation 1027, MNDAA captured Lashio city and the Northeastern Regional Military Command, while TNLA captured Kutkai, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio, and Hsipaw along the Mandalay\u2013Muse highway. Why, then, are the two forces now fighting each other?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The simple answer is that their respective interests and objectives have come into conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ethnic armed organizations, which are structured primarily around ethnic identity, often do not share identical political positions or future political goals. In some cases, they may lack clearly articulated political doctrines or consistent ideological foundations. Instead, many of these organizations are built upon ethnic nationalism\u2014prioritizing their own ethnic group above all else\u2014combined with reliance on military strength. This may be a major underlying factor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When ethnic nationalism merges with militarism, prioritizing the idea that the strongest military force ultimately determines outcomes, conflicts tend to arise in areas where territories overlap\u2014particularly over control of land, natural resources, taxation, and recruitment of new soldiers. As a result, disputes increasingly end up being resolved through armed confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In political science terms, the current conflict between the two armed forces could be described as \u201cinter-ethnic conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such conflicts are likely not limited to northern Shan State. During politically and militarily unstable periods like the present, similar tensions could emerge in other ethnic regions as well\u2014for example:
\u2022 Pa-O and Karenni (Kayah) areas
\u2022 Rakhine and Chin regions
\u2022 Shanni and Kachin areas
\u2022 Ta\u2019ang and Kachin areas<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disputes over administration, taxation, recruitment, and the behavior of one ethnic armed group toward other ethnic communities during armed conflict can all generate grievances or tensions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inter-ethnic conflicts can be resolved in two fundamentally different ways:
\u2022 through peaceful methods, such as open discussion, criticism, fair legal systems, referendums, and political negotiations; or
\u2022 through armed confrontation, like the clashes currently occurring between the two armed forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The successes of Operation 1027 occurred at a time when the military regime underestimated the revolutionary forces\u2019 ability to unite. By coordinating their efforts, the revolutionary groups were able to open multiple fronts simultaneously and launch large-scale offensives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, after revolutionary forces began gaining territorial control throughout late 2023 and throughout 2024, the unity that had enabled those victories began to cool and weaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is not entirely accurate to conclude that all developments since Operation 1027 are solely the result of Chinese pressure or interference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is true that China pressured the northern armed groups involved in Operation 1027 to agree to ceasefires, fearing the rapid momentum of the operation, the potential collapse of the coup regime\u2014which functioned as the de facto central government\u2014and the possibility that Myanmar might fragment into territories controlled by different armed groups, leading to further conflicts among them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China reportedly exerted pressure by:
\u2022 closing border gates to block flows of weapons, ammunition, and funds to northern revolutionary groups via the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and
\u2022 controlling assets held by these groups inside China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These actions are widely acknowledged facts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, attributing every development since Operation 1027 entirely to Chinese manipulation risks overlooking the need for internal reflection by the armed groups themselves. Such an explanation effectively shifts all responsibility to external actors while avoiding questions such as:
\u2022 whether alliances have weakened due to conflicting interests, or
\u2022 whether political principles such as democracy and federalism have been drifting further away from the movements\u2019 practices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it is reasonable to assume that the enemy will always attempt to weaken alliances and provoke divisions among allies, it should also be remembered that if internal resilience is strong, enemy strategies and tactics will not easily succeed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from March 15 (MoeMaKa),\u00a0March 16, 2026 Clashes and Interpretations Surrounding Fighting Between Northern Alliance Armed Groups In recent days, the armed conflict that has broken out between two members of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance\u2014the Ta\u2019ang…<\/p>\n

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