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Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 January 17 Scene<\/em> Myanmar\u2019s military claims it is achieving the outcomes it wants in the second phase of the election, and its media outlets are broadcasting that message with great fanfare. In addition, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Myanmar is facing a case concerning the genocide of the Rohingya, the military side\u2019s pleadings are being presented in detailed news articles and reports. It has also been acknowledged that the Myanmar military recognized and used the term \u201cRohingya.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is reported that in a speech delivered by Brigadier General Aung Gyi at the 1961 disarmament ceremony of Mujahid armed groups, the term \u201cRohingya\u201d was used. The account says that when Mujahid groups requested that they not be called \u201cBengali\u201d and instead be referred to as \u201cRohingya,\u201d the government accommodated that request in order to make state authority effective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another notable point found in the military\u2019s rebuttal is an implicit admission of a governing mindset that divides the country\u2019s communities into \u201cethnic nationalities\u201d and \u201cnon-ethnic\/foreign races,\u201d rather than treating them equally. One example cited is that at the time, Myanmar Radio separated programming into two categories: \u201cethnic-language programs\u201d and \u201cborder-area minority programs.\u201d Because the Rohingya (then referred to as \u201cBengali\u201d) broadcast program was not regarded as an \u201cethnic nationality\u201d program, it was placed under \u201cborder-area minority programs\u201d\u2014a classification that, the submission claims, can be verified through daily newspapers from 1961. The author suggests this reflects a continuity with colonial-era practices, when the British also administered the \u201chills\u201d and the \u201cplains\u201d under separate systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the military moves toward the third phase of the election, reports say the USDP\u2014the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party\u2014is winning the most seats so far in Phase (2). The USDP has claimed it has already secured 146 seats<\/em> in the lower house. Reports also note that, if these seats are combined with the 25% of seats reserved for military appointees<\/em>, the USDP says it can form a government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On January 15<\/em>, the election commission announced the names and vote results of 52<\/em> lower-house candidates who won in Phase (2). Of those 52 seats, 44<\/em> were reportedly won by the USDP. According to the commission\u2019s Phase (1) announcements, the USDP had already gained 102<\/em> lower-house seats; when combined with the Phase (2) winners, the total becomes 146<\/em> seats. Since Phase (3) is also expected to end in their one-sided favor, the party may already be speaking openly as if its long-held \u201cdream\u201d of forming a parliament and a government is about to become reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Alongside election news and the ICJ courtroom scenes from The Gambia\u2019s case, what has most captured public attention is the tension\u2014mutual arrests, accusations, and condemnations\u2014between Bo Nagar\u2019s resistance armed group in central Myanmar and armed units under the NUG\u2019s township People\u2019s Defense Forces (PaKaFa).<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Myanmar Now, in Pale Township, Sagaing Region<\/em>, a local NUG checkpoint<\/em> was raided this morning by the locally based Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA)<\/em>. During the raid, shots were fired; a checkpoint officer was detained; and two firearms were taken, based on information from the township PaKaFa. The report adds that BNRA\u2014widely known as \u201cBo Nagar\u2019s force\u201d\u2014raided an NUG tax checkpoint in Pan Village<\/em> at around 11:30 a.m. on January 17<\/em>, firing shots and detaining Ko Min Khine<\/em>, a member of the People\u2019s Security (PaLaFa), according to township PaKaFa deputy Dr. Nan Win. Prior to this incident, there had already been a case in which NUG forces raided Bo Nagar\u2019s tax checkpoint and seized weapons. Reports also mention disputes and direct confrontations among lower-level fighters within the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Myanmar, after many armed groups emerged, it was common in the early period to hear that tensions and disputes were reported to the NUG\u2019s defense, home affairs, and judicial mechanisms\u2014through complaints, incident reports, and requests for adjudication. More recently, however, the pattern has shifted: public statements often come first, with each side speaking for itself and issuing accusations against the other. The language about \u201cseeking solutions\u201d has become quieter. The author notes that unless a mediating body or mechanism can be established to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation between the sides, it will not be easy to extinguish the flames of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As an illustrative example, political and military positions have diverged to such an extent that various political and armed organizations have already withdrawn or temporarily suspended participation from the NUCC\u2014an alliance they had once formed together. In the early revolutionary period, NUCC seemed to function as a meeting point and a mediation culture\/mechanism: a place that included strike groups, social organizations, human-rights actors, student unions, minority activists, and those who did not take up arms or partisan politics\u2014so that coordination, negotiation, and problem-solving could take place. But after armed groups and politically interest-driven organizations pulled back and withdrew, the need has become more obvious: when armed and political groups face disputes that require resolution, an impartial, trusted pillar\u2014a clean, credible mechanism for mediation\u2014is vital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At this stage, within the revolution, the idea that \u201cwe will work with those who agree with us, and separate from those we differ with\u201d may sound like a convenient justification. Yet the author argues that people must think ahead about how to prevent harmful outcomes\u2014splits, conflicts, and escalation\u2014caused by disagreements that emerge halfway along the path.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If both sides insist they are right, then a culture of mediation and problem-solving is needed\u2014along with trusted, respected community arrangements that can arbitrate fairly and credibly. Without such protective arrangements, the author warns, the likely outcome is that an unwanted actor\u2014an organization, or even a foreign state\u2014may step in, using power to intervene and impose influence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u00a0 Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 January 17 SceneJanuary 18, 2026 How will armed groups resolve friction among themselves? Myanmar\u2019s military claims it is achieving the outcomes it wants in the second phase of the election, and its media outlets are…<\/p>\n
January 18, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\nHow will armed groups resolve friction among themselves?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n