{"id":8376,"date":"2025-11-29T06:38:39","date_gmt":"2025-11-29T00:08:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=8376"},"modified":"2025-11-29T06:38:39","modified_gmt":"2025-11-29T00:08:39","slug":"pdf-forces-withdraw-from-mogok-and-moe-meik-strategy-beyond-operation-1027","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/11\/pdf-forces-withdraw-from-mogok-and-moe-meik-strategy-beyond-operation-1027\/","title":{"rendered":"PDF Forces Withdraw from Mogok and Moe Meik \u2013 Strategy Beyond Operation 1027"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

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Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 View from November 27
(MoeMaKa) November 28, 2025<\/p>\n

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PDF Forces Withdraw from Mogok and Moe Meik \u2013 Strategy Beyond Operation 1027<\/h3>\n

News outlets that focus on Mandalay Region and northern Shan affairs are reporting that PDF units inside Mogok and Moe Meik<\/strong> have now withdrawn from those towns.<\/p>\n

Under the ceasefire agreement reached between the TNLA<\/strong> and the junta\u2019s forces in late October, Mogok and Moe Meik are to be handed back to the military by the end of November.<\/p>\n

For the PDF groups that took part in the urban offensives to capture these towns in alliance with TNLA, the fact that towns they helped seize are now being handed back to the junta has been extremely hard to accept. At the end of October, the \u201cMogok Strategic Group\u201d PDF even publicly declared that they would not allow junta forces to re-enter and would continue to defend the town.<\/p>\n

However, because TNLA, which has been the lead force in controlling these towns, agreed to bring junta troops back in under a security arrangement as part of the ceasefire, PDFs have now pulled out in order not to damage their relations with TNLA and the broader alliance.<\/p>\n

For MDY PDF and other groups, having to hand Mogok back \u201cwithout firing a single shot\u201d<\/strong> in its defense has put them in a position where they risk losing the trust of the public that has supported them.<\/p>\n

After losing Naung Cho, Kyaukme and Hsipaw<\/strong> within a few months, TNLA then agreed to a ceasefire and to hand back two towns.<\/p>\n

TNLA has cited two main reasons for its decision to stop fighting the junta:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    Airstrikes<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Pressure from China<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The airstrikes did not only hit the towns being handed back now, but also places like Namtu and Namhsan<\/strong>, which lie inside TNLA\u2019s own autonomous administrative area.<\/p>\n

    As for \u201cChinese pressure,\u201d it remains unclear exactly what issues Beijing leaned on TNLA over. What is apparent is that the type and weight of Chinese pressure on the Kokang region<\/strong> is not the same as that on the Ta\u2019ang region.<\/p>\n

    In Kokang, the armed group\u2019s leaders and their economic interests\u2014property, trade in basic commodities and consumer goods, etc.\u2014are heavily dependent on China. But for the Ta\u2019ang area, there is no clear sign of that same structural dependence<\/em> on China for essentials such as food, arms and ammunition.<\/p>\n

    One important point is this: a few months before the ceasefire, UWSA<\/strong> publicly announced that it would no longer be able to provide arms, ammunition and financial support to its ally ethnic armed groups.<\/p>\n

    Given these factors and pressures, TNLA\u2019s decision to agree a ceasefire with the military and return two towns has undoubtedly damaged both political and military cooperation<\/strong> among the anti-junta forces.<\/p>\n

    Even before TNLA\u2019s ceasefire, cooperation had already been shaken when the MNDAA in Kokang<\/strong> agreed a truce and handed back Lashio<\/strong>, undermining in part the joint momentum created during Operation 1027.<\/p>\n

    Throughout Operation 1027 there were already criticisms and feelings of being sidelined regarding:<\/p>\n