{"id":8092,"date":"2025-10-17T21:46:53","date_gmt":"2025-10-17T15:16:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=8092"},"modified":"2025-10-17T21:46:53","modified_gmt":"2025-10-17T15:16:53","slug":"the-third-town-lost-by-the-tnla-in-northern-shan-state-within-four-months","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/10\/the-third-town-lost-by-the-tnla-in-northern-shan-state-within-four-months\/","title":{"rendered":"The Third Town Lost by the TNLA in Northern Shan State Within Four Months"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

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Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 October 16: Scene<\/strong>
(MoeMaKa, October 17, 2025)<\/em><\/p>\n

The Third Town Lost by the TNLA in Northern Shan State Within Four Months<\/strong><\/p>\n

Counting from mid-July 2025, over the past four months the Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)<\/strong> has lost control of three towns<\/strong> it once held in northern Shan State<\/strong>. The first was Naungcho<\/strong>, surrendered in mid-July; the second, Kyaukme<\/strong>, on October 1; and most recently, on October 16<\/strong>, Hsipaw<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

After the junta\u2019s forces recaptured Naungcho along the Mandalay\u2013Muse Union Highway, they continued advancing northward, taking Kyaukme two weeks ago and then pushing further along the same route to seize Hsipaw.<\/p>\n

The military\u2019s campaign reportedly took months \u2014 a month-long siege for Naungcho, then over two months to take Kyaukme. After capturing Kyaukme, they moved on to Hsipaw, a smaller but strategically located town on the main highway.<\/p>\n

Unlike the Bhamo battle<\/strong> in Kachin State \u2014 where the KIA and junta have fought inside the city for nearly ten months \u2014 the fighting in Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw didn\u2019t involve heavy street battles. Instead, it unfolded mainly in defensible terrain between the towns<\/strong>, along the road corridors, following military strategic lines.<\/p>\n

The TNLA mounted resistance but seemingly did not intend to pour all its manpower into holding these three towns. Instead, analysts believe the TNLA is focusing on protecting its heartland<\/strong> \u2014 around Namhsan, Namtu, and Mantong<\/strong>, as well as maintaining control of key border trade routes near Muse and the 105-Mile border gate<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

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Strategic and Political Background<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Looking back to the start of Operation 1027<\/strong> on October 27, 2023<\/strong>, the first six to nine months saw unprecedented cooperation among the Brotherhood Alliance<\/strong> \u2014 the TNLA<\/strong>, MNDAA<\/strong>, and AA<\/strong> \u2014 alongside thousands of resistance fighters from other allied groups.<\/p>\n

During that period, they captured dozens of junta bases, regional commands, and operation centers, marking the height of military and political coordination<\/strong> among anti-junta forces.<\/p>\n

But by mid-2025, that momentum waned. In the four months since, the TNLA has lost three key towns \u2014 a reversal that analysts attribute to multiple causes.<\/p>\n

Some point to Chinese pressure<\/strong>, growing competition among allied forces<\/strong> over territory, taxation rights, and local resources, and tensions among ethnic factions<\/strong> \u2014 all of which weakened unity against the junta.
Disputes over resource extraction rights<\/strong>, military recruitment zones<\/strong>, and control of trade checkpoints<\/strong> also played roles.<\/p>\n

The TNLA leadership has reportedly acknowledged internal criticisms and stated that it is reviewing these setbacks<\/strong> and learning lessons<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

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China\u2019s Influence and the End of the Brotherhood\u2019s Coordination<\/strong><\/h3>\n

China\u2019s policy toward Myanmar \u2014 especially its push to freeze Operation 1027<\/strong> earlier this year \u2014 was a key turning point.
Another major factor was the fragmentation<\/strong> of the once-cohesive anti-junta coalition under the Brotherhood\u2019s umbrella.<\/p>\n

The MNDAA\u2019s ceasefire<\/strong> with the junta, and the UWSA\u2019s (United Wa State Army) withdrawal of logistical and financial support<\/strong> for 1027-related offensives, were major blows to coordination and morale.<\/p>\n

In 2023\u20132024, all three Brotherhood groups had fought in sync. But now, as the junta regains the initiative and launches counteroffensives, each group is forced to defend separately<\/strong>, stretching manpower and logistics thin.<\/p>\n

This shift is expected to have major consequences<\/strong> for the broader Spring Revolution<\/strong> and the effort to dismantle military rule.<\/p>\n

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What Comes Next<\/strong><\/h3>\n

With Hsipaw<\/strong> now under junta control, observers are asking: Which town will be targeted next?<\/em><\/p>\n

Given that the Mandalay\u2013Muse Union Highway<\/strong> is critical both economically and militarily, it\u2019s likely that the junta will prioritize securing the full route<\/strong>.
Possible next targets include Hseni (Theinni)<\/strong> and Kutkai<\/strong>, both along the same axis.<\/p>\n