![\"\"](\"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-15.png\")
<\/a><\/h1>\nMyanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Viewpoint for October 5<\/h1>\n
(MoeMaKa) October 6, 2025<\/p>\n
Is the revolutionary tide ebbing?<\/h2>\n
Nearly four and a half years\u2014almost five\u2014have passed since the coup. After the 2020 election victory, the NLD\u2019s MPs formed the National Unity Government (NUG) and organized armed units known as PDFs. Now, more than four years into the armed struggle, a question and doubt are surfacing: is the armed revolution losing momentum?<\/strong><\/p>\n Up to the end of 2024, battlefield gains by ethnic armed organizations and by NUG\/PDF forces reached their high-water mark<\/strong>. Hopes that the armed uprising would soon succeed also peaked.<\/p>\n Across much of the country\u2014northern Shan, Rakhine, Karen, Kachin, Karenni (Kayah), Chin and Tanintharyi, and the regions of Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway\u2014the junta suffered repeated defeats<\/strong>, even losing towns, bases and regional headquarters. That situation held only for a few months. The junta then reassessed its strategy<\/strong>, replenished manpower and equipment, and resumed operations.<\/p>\n Thanks to the conscription law<\/strong>, lost personnel were quickly replaced. The military also filled gaps in drones, anti-drone\/jamming technology, munitions<\/strong> and related gear. After being battered by drones during the first phase of Operation 1027<\/strong>, by 2025 the junta had leveraged purchasing power and technology to regain a clear advantage<\/strong> in these areas.<\/p>\n This turnaround did not come from weapons and logistics alone. Diplomatic backing<\/strong>\u2014especially from powerful neighbors China and India<\/strong>, who supply or facilitate weapons and technology\u2014also helped the junta recover. The major earthquakes<\/strong> that struck Sagaing, Mandalay and Nay Pyi Taw<\/strong> created opportunities to re-engage internationally.<\/p>\n In resistance-held areas, even those hit by the quakes, there were few channels to receive international aid directly; the outside world largely dealt with the junta as the de facto authority<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Overall, the junta managed to extract advantage from the earthquakes and shifts in global geopolitics. From March to September the coup leader reportedly made nearly ten overseas trips<\/strong>\u2014to Thailand, Russia, Beijing and several former Soviet states. After the quakes, even ASEAN foreign ministers came to Nay Pyi Taw. Years of isolation after the coup have been partly broken<\/strong>\u2014ironically, by a natural disaster.<\/p>\n Alongside these diplomatic shifts, China\u2019s use of border trade as leverage<\/strong> inside Myanmar to pressure ethnic groups also buoyed the junta\u2019s morale. At the same time, joint operations among resistance forces have slackened.<\/strong><\/p>\n Of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance<\/strong> (three groups), only two<\/strong> are currently engaging the junta; and the kind of nationwide support in 2023\u20132024\u2014when groups from southern Shan, central Myanmar and Karenni joined northern Shan battles\u2014has not reappeared. Reasons may include shortages of weapons\/ammunition<\/strong> and disagreements<\/strong> among allies over how to share the gains from joint offensives.<\/p>\n After the surge in mid\u2013late 2024, the revolutionary tide stalled<\/strong>, and by mid-2025 it began to recede<\/strong>. Due to junta offensives, some towns in northern Shan were lost; in Karen and Karenni, certain towns and bases were also retaken. Only on the Rakhine front has the junta remained largely unable to advance, while around Bhamo<\/strong> the army has pushed back KIA<\/strong> pressure and even re-entered Hpakant<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Diplomatically and militarily, the present phase is one of pause or pullback<\/strong>. Hence the worry now arising among anti-junta forces: is the revolution\u2019s tide going out?<\/strong><\/p>\n In these four to five years the resistance surged forward and pressed the dictatorship hard; the glow of a decisive victory once seemed near. But the tide has since ebbed<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Five years is not necessarily long for an armed revolution, but sustaining a longer war requires material resources, money, manpower, and public support<\/strong>\u2014and the public\u2019s capacity has limits.<\/p>\n Recently Maung Saungkha<\/strong> of BPLA cautioned against rallying people by naming specific dates or years<\/strong> for victory. Victory will come, he said, but promising a timetable misleads the public.<\/p>\n Even before his remarks, many people had already begun to sense\u2014on both political and military fronts\u2014that the balance is shifting<\/strong>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Viewpoint for October 5 (MoeMaKa) October 6, 2025 Is the revolutionary tide ebbing? Nearly four and a half years\u2014almost five\u2014have passed since the coup. After the 2020 election victory, the NLD\u2019s MPs formed the National Unity…<\/p>\n