{"id":7882,"date":"2025-10-01T02:56:18","date_gmt":"2025-09-30T20:26:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=7882"},"modified":"2025-10-01T02:56:22","modified_gmt":"2025-09-30T20:26:22","slug":"kyaukme-becomes-the-second-town-the-tnla-has-had-to-withdraw-from","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/10\/kyaukme-becomes-the-second-town-the-tnla-has-had-to-withdraw-from\/","title":{"rendered":"Kyaukme Becomes the Second Town the TNLA Has Had to Withdraw From"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\"\"<\/a><\/h1>\n

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 View from September 29<\/h1>\n

(MoeMaKa), September 30, 2025<\/p>\n

Kyaukme Becomes the Second Town the TNLA Has Had to Withdraw From<\/h2>\n

After the junta retook Nawnghkio<\/strong> in mid-July\u2014ending roughly a year of TNLA control\u2014events two-plus months later now suggest the army is close to capturing Kyaukme<\/strong> as well. In the second wave of Operation 1027<\/strong>, the TNLA had rapidly seized Mogok<\/strong>, Kyaukme<\/strong>, and Nawnghkio<\/strong>. At that time, junta forces lost, in quick succession, towns, bases, strategic posts and operational headquarters across the Kokang<\/strong> area, northern Shan State<\/strong>, and the northern Sagaing areas bordering northern Shan, and for about a year mounted a last-ditch defense around Taung Khan<\/strong> south of Nawnghkio.<\/p>\n

Since early 2025, however, the ceasefire between the junta and Kokang forces gave the military council breathing room to recover from its most constrained phase, regroup manpower, and rework strategy and tactics.<\/p>\n

With Taung Khan<\/strong> held as a forward line for nearly a year, the TNLA gradually pulled back; in recent months the junta recaptured Nawnghkio<\/strong> and then pushed on to Kyaukme<\/strong>. If Kyaukme falls, many conclude that Hsipaw<\/strong> and Mogok<\/strong> could be the next targets for junta offensives.<\/p>\n

The Muse\u2013Mandalay<\/strong> corridor is not only a cross-border trade route but also the single most strategic line for administration and territorial control. In Myanmar\u2013China trade, the Mandalay\u2013Muse<\/strong> route, and the Sagaing\u2013Shwebo\u2013Mansi\u2013Bhamo<\/strong> route to the Chinese border, are the shortest, most convenient links from central Myanmar. From this angle, the junta will throw everything into holding Bhamo<\/strong> while also pushing hard to re-establish control over the Kyaukme\u2013Lashio\u2013Muse<\/strong> road.<\/p>\n

This raises the question: why can\u2019t the TNLA now carry out the kind of rapid offensives and territorial takeovers it achieved in the first and second phases of Operation 1027? Since the January<\/strong> ceasefire between the military and the MNDAA<\/strong>, the Northern Alliance no longer conducts joint strikes in the same way. Moreover, other armed groups that previously provided manpower and joint operations\u2014PLA<\/strong>, BPLA<\/strong>, KNDF<\/strong>, and PDFs from Sagaing Region<\/strong>\u2014have not been assisting this year. There\u2019s no clear answer as to why these forces are no longer fighting together. Some attribute it to Chinese pressure<\/strong> on the Wa, Kokang, and TNLA, but such pressure does not extend to every armed group in the central Dry Zone or the east. For example, groups like KNDF<\/strong>, BPLA<\/strong>, and PDFs in Sagaing<\/strong> and Mandalay<\/strong> have not been able to mass fighters as before\u2014likely for political and organizational (mobilization) reasons as well.<\/p>\n

After the TNLA captured areas, frictions over territorial administration and tax collection<\/strong> arose with neighboring allies such as the KIA<\/strong> along shared boundaries\u2014another factor that may have left the TNLA more isolated.<\/p>\n

On the afternoon of September 29<\/strong>, a Ta\u2019ang-area media outlet, Shwe Phi Myay<\/strong>, ran an analysis titled along the lines of \u201cTracing the Reasons the Ta\u2019ang Army Is Losing Towns.\u201d It argued that arms smuggling by TNLA officers<\/strong> and misuse of soldiers\u2019 monthly allowances and living expenses<\/strong> had led to ammunition shortages and falling morale. According to the piece, what began as selling captured junta weapons (e.g., RPG rounds) evolved into selling off ammo delivered<\/strong> for TNLA operations. The article was taken down a few hours after publication.<\/p>\n

The TNLA won many victories and seized towns, areas, and bases during the first two phases of Operation 1027<\/strong>. Now, facing junta offensives largely on its own<\/strong>, Chinese pressure is undoubtedly a major factor; but beyond withstanding that pressure, the TNLA also needs to value and preserve alliances<\/strong> with other armed groups and reassess how to secure the support of local populations of different ethnicities<\/strong> in areas it governs. Ups and downs are part and parcel of armed struggle; at the same time, today\u2019s conditions are also pushing toward renewed effort on the political and mass-organizing<\/strong> front.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 View from September 29 (MoeMaKa), September 30, 2025 Kyaukme Becomes the Second Town the TNLA Has Had to Withdraw From After the junta retook Nawnghkio in mid-July\u2014ending roughly a year of TNLA control\u2014events two-plus months later…<\/p>\n

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