{"id":7292,"date":"2025-08-17T21:24:17","date_gmt":"2025-08-17T14:54:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=7292"},"modified":"2025-08-17T21:24:20","modified_gmt":"2025-08-17T14:54:20","slug":"meeting-between-mndaa-and-lashio-military-command-marks-one-year-since-chinas-backing-of-the-junta","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/08\/meeting-between-mndaa-and-lashio-military-command-marks-one-year-since-chinas-backing-of-the-junta\/","title":{"rendered":"Meeting Between MNDAA and Lashio Military Command Marks One Year Since China\u2019s Backing of the Junta"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

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Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 August 15 Perspective<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Moemaka, August 16, 2025<\/em><\/p>\n

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Meeting Between MNDAA and Lashio Military Command Marks One Year Since China\u2019s Backing of the Junta<\/strong><\/h3>\n

It has now been over a year since the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) launched a major offensive and captured Lashio<\/strong> in late July 2024, during the first phase of Operation 1027<\/strong>. Since then, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw)<\/strong> has gradually regained full control of Lashio and the Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

On August 14, 2025<\/strong>, a meeting took place<\/strong> between commanders from the MNDAA and the Northeastern Military Command at a hotel in Lashio. This marked a significant shift, not only in the relationship between the two sides but also in the visible restoration of relations backed by China<\/strong>, which had been monitoring the ceasefire and facilitated the return of Lashio to military control in April 2025<\/strong>. Chinese observers had attended the official handover ceremony back then, although their presence at this new meeting is unconfirmed.<\/p>\n

Unlike prior peace talks led by the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Committee (NSPC)<\/strong>, this meeting was held at the military regional command level<\/strong>, not at a high-level political delegation level. The content of the meeting has not been publicly disclosed, but reports suggest that the military requested the MNDAA to hand back control of Hseni (Theinni)<\/strong>, a key town still held by the group. However, MNDAA reportedly refused.<\/p>\n

Initial reports also indicated that representatives from the United Wa State Army (UWSA)<\/strong> may have joined the meeting, but this was later denied by UWSA spokespersons.<\/p>\n

The military is reportedly seeking to secure full control of the Mandalay\u2013Muse highway<\/strong>, and recently reclaimed Nawnghkio<\/strong> without military engagement. To do so, they would need to secure major towns along the route, including Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Hseni, Kutkai, and Muse 105-Mile Trade Zone<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

There were also earlier rumors that the MNDAA was preparing to return Hseni<\/strong>, with some material being withdrawn from the area, but the group has neither confirmed nor denied this. Residents have only observed the MNDAA continuing regular governance and development work<\/strong> in Hseni.<\/p>\n

Not long ago, a junta airstrike on a hotel in Kutkai<\/strong>, a town held by both the MNDAA and TNLA, resulted in casualties. This led to MNDAA statements that such attacks could undermine the ceasefire<\/strong>, and some news outlets speculated that clashes between the military and MNDAA might resume.<\/p>\n

Looking back, the first phase of Operation 1027<\/strong> was followed by ceasefire agreements with MNDAA and TNLA, but now, in the post-second phase<\/strong>, the ceasefire is only between MNDAA and the military<\/strong>. This suggests that the Northern Brotherhood Alliance<\/strong> (MNDAA, TNLA, AA) is no longer acting in unison under Chinese pressure, which was likely the key factor behind the MNDAA handing over Lashio last April.<\/p>\n

A key difference between the past and present ceasefires is the lack of coordination<\/strong> between MNDAA and other anti-junta resistance forces since the Lashio handover. There have been no visible joint operations<\/strong> or cooperative movements between MNDAA and other resistance groups.<\/p>\n

This raises the interpretation that MNDAA may now be engaging more in negotiated positioning<\/strong> with the junta than in active military operations like during Operation 1027.<\/p>\n

China’s strategic position<\/strong> \u2014 that junta collapse is unacceptable<\/strong> \u2014 became increasingly clear in mid-2024. After MNDAA captured Lashio, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi<\/strong> visited Naypyidaw while attending the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Summit<\/strong> in Chiang Mai, Thailand \u2014 a visit that marked a turning point<\/strong> in international backing for the embattled junta.<\/p>\n

That visit also reasserted China\u2019s \u201cThree Principles<\/strong>\u201d for Myanmar:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    No international interference<\/strong>,<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Preserve regional stability<\/strong>,<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Do not allow the junta\u2019s collapse to destabilize the border region<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Later in August 2024, a Chinese special envoy<\/strong> met with UWSA leaders on the border, and records of that meeting only leaked recently.<\/p>\n

    Now, a year later, China continues to support the military junta<\/strong>, including its plan to hold an election. China maintains direct contact with ethnic armed groups<\/strong>, pressuring them not to disrupt<\/strong> the junta\u2019s proposed election process.<\/p>\n

    The military is now assessing which townships under emergency rule<\/strong> will participate in the election. Since the military itself will organize and announce candidates \u2014 possibly from one or multiple pro-junta parties \u2014 the international community is watching closely.<\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 August 15 Perspective Moemaka, August 16, 2025 Meeting Between MNDAA and Lashio Military Command Marks One Year Since China\u2019s Backing of the Junta It has now been over a year since the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance…<\/p>\n

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