{"id":6983,"date":"2025-07-23T04:53:42","date_gmt":"2025-07-22T22:23:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=6983"},"modified":"2025-07-23T04:53:45","modified_gmt":"2025-07-22T22:23:45","slug":"the-fall-of-naung-cho-and-mobye-reflections-on-the-spring-revolutions-strategic-direction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/07\/the-fall-of-naung-cho-and-mobye-reflections-on-the-spring-revolutions-strategic-direction\/","title":{"rendered":"The Fall of Naung Cho and Mobye: Reflections on the Spring Revolution\u2019s Strategic Direction"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

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Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 July 21 Viewpoint<\/strong>
(MoeMaKa, July 22, 2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n

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The Fall of Naung Cho and Mobye: Reflections on the Spring Revolution\u2019s Strategic Direction<\/h3>\n

In recent days, the Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)<\/strong> lost control of Naung Cho<\/strong>, a town it had governed for over a year. Around the same time, Mobye<\/strong>, a town in Karenni (Kayah) State<\/strong>, also fell from the hands of KNDF and allied resistance forces<\/strong>. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)<\/strong> has been attempting for over six months<\/strong> to seize Bhamo<\/strong> and the adjacent SAC’s Strategic Command HQ No. 21<\/strong>, but has not succeeded. The offensive appears to be stalling.<\/p>\n

Elsewhere, in Hpakant<\/strong>, once declared free of junta forces, the military junta has returned<\/strong>\u2014deploying 800 to 1000 troops<\/strong> and reaching the area largely unimpeded. There were no effective defensive operations<\/strong> by the KIA to stop this movement.<\/p>\n

In Mandalay Region<\/strong>, the junta has recaptured some territories<\/strong> previously held by MDY-PDF<\/strong>, though there are also reports of some junta bases being overtaken by resistance forces.<\/p>\n

In Karen State<\/strong>, the KNU<\/strong> has successfully seized several border outposts<\/strong>, but no towns have been captured in recent weeks. The Arakan Army (AA)<\/strong>, which had extended operations into border areas of Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway<\/strong>, is now focusing efforts on capturing Kyaukphyu<\/strong>, the last major junta-held city in Rakhine.<\/p>\n

In Lashio<\/strong>, the junta is reinforcing and appears to be trying to restore the city to the status of a regional military command center<\/strong>. Meanwhile, an earlier junta expedition from Kalay to Thantlang<\/strong> aimed at retaking control of Chin State was repelled by local Chin defense forces and forced to retreat.<\/p>\n

In Sagaing Region<\/strong>, the situation is relatively static. While outposts like Kan Daunt<\/strong> have seen skirmishes, no major towns have changed hands<\/strong>. Similarly, in Pa-O<\/strong>, Mon State<\/strong>, and Tanintharyi<\/strong>, both sides have mostly maintained their positions, with no significant losses or gains.<\/p>\n

The Strategic Implications of Losing Naung Cho and Mobye<\/h3>\n

The loss of Naung Cho and Mobye<\/strong> has triggered a variety of commentaries from analysts, observers, and columnists<\/strong>, some of which have been published in independent media outlets.<\/p>\n

Some have criticized TNLA for allegedly focusing more on governing and taxing<\/strong> the areas it captured, pushing for recognition of the “Palaung State,” and for friction with other resistance forces over taxation and natural resource control<\/strong>\u2014factors that may have contributed to weakening its strategic coordination and vulnerability to junta counterattacks.<\/p>\n

In the case of Mobye<\/strong>, the dynamics were reportedly different. According to KNDF\u2019s deputy commander-in-chief Mawii<\/strong>, in an interview with DVB<\/strong>, the junta was able to retake the city due to disregard for casualties on their side<\/strong>, while the resistance prioritized minimizing loss of life<\/strong>. Furthermore, the junta received support from the pro-junta PNO (Pa-O National Organization)<\/strong>, and according to another news outlet citing resistance sources, the use of drones<\/strong> by the military junta was a decisive factor.<\/p>\n

While each of these explanations may be valid in their own contexts, the larger issue is clear: the Spring Revolution lacks a unified national military strategy<\/strong>. Even during Operation 1027<\/strong>, though not technically a nationwide operation, there was a concurrent surge of coordinated attacks<\/strong> across multiple fronts\u2014suggesting a temporary unified strategic alignment.<\/p>\n

At the time, various resistance groups from Sagaing, Magway, southern and northern Shan, Mandalay, and Karenni<\/strong> supported the Three Brotherhood Alliance<\/strong> with manpower and coordination. That level of cooperation appears to have diminished<\/strong> in the current phase.<\/p>\n

This raises questions:<\/p>\n