{"id":6410,"date":"2025-06-10T01:37:04","date_gmt":"2025-06-09T19:07:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=6410"},"modified":"2025-06-10T01:37:04","modified_gmt":"2025-06-09T19:07:04","slug":"tnla-gradually-retreating-from-held-territories-under-chinese-pressure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/06\/tnla-gradually-retreating-from-held-territories-under-chinese-pressure\/","title":{"rendered":"TNLA Gradually Retreating from Held Territories Under Chinese Pressure"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\"\"<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n

“Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 June 8 View”<\/strong><\/p>\n

(MoeMaKa, June 9, 2025):<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

TNLA Gradually Retreating from Held Territories Under Chinese Pressure<\/strong><\/h3>\n

As relations between China<\/strong> and Myanmar\u2019s military junta<\/strong> have improved, ethnic armed groups based in northern Shan State<\/strong> and northeastern Myanmar\u2014especially those located near the Chinese border\u2014are being forced to recalibrate their military goals. Specifically, this involves the MNDAA<\/strong> (Kokang), TNLA<\/strong> (Ta\u2019ang), and KIA<\/strong> (Kachin). The AA<\/strong> (Arakan Army), though part of the Brotherhood Alliance, operates primarily in Rakhine State<\/strong> and does not rely on China in the same strategic way\u2014particularly for trade and military transit routes. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s fully free from Chinese influence either.<\/p>\n

Up until mid-2024, the Three Brotherhood Alliance<\/strong> saw rapid battlefield success. But by August 2024<\/strong>, shifts in China’s policy led ethnic armed groups to reevaluate their territorial control and military advances. The MNDAA formally agreed to a ceasefire with the junta<\/strong> following pressure from China.<\/p>\n

While there’s no public statement from the KIA<\/strong> and TNLA<\/strong> confirming similar agreements, it is widely assumed that China has also been pressuring or negotiating with them. However, specific details from the groups themselves remain undisclosed.<\/p>\n

Recently, the TNLA<\/strong>, which had held Naungcho town<\/strong> for about a year and maintained frontlines far beyond its outskirts (such as at Taung Kham), began retreating. The clashes have now reached close to Naungcho<\/strong> itself, causing residents to flee for the second time.<\/p>\n

By the end of 2023 and into 2024, TNLA had seized control of as many as 12 towns<\/strong> and established administration. However, in some areas, it removed long-standing ethnic markers<\/strong>, faced friction with other anti-junta forces, and relocated troops and liaison offices<\/strong>, indicating internal tensions.<\/p>\n

These dynamics have affected unity among resistance groups<\/strong>, especially in northern Shan. The joint goal of dismantling the military dictatorship that seemed strong during the early phase of Operation 1027<\/strong> now appears to have weakened. Many of the groups that participated in the initial or second phases no longer seem aligned with the same Spring Revolution ideals.<\/p>\n

While it\u2019s unclear exactly how previous agreements were made, public statements by the Brotherhood Alliance during the operation had pledged a full fight to remove the military regime. Many hoped Operation 1027<\/strong> would lead beyond Shan State and even reach Naypyidaw<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

However, such hopes have waned since late last year. The MNDAA\u2019s ceasefire<\/strong> and their withdrawal from Lashio<\/strong>, as well as recent clashes between ethnic forces<\/strong>, have all contributed. After gaining territory, some groups shifted focus to administration, taxation, and resource extraction<\/strong>, appearing to prioritize their own interests over collective revolutionary goals.<\/p>\n

In addition to China’s diplomatic pressure, these internal challenges have slowed territorial expansion into central Myanmar<\/strong> and halted momentum in northern Shan<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Now, TNLA\u2019s capacity to hold Naungcho<\/strong>, and whether it can continue to maintain control of key towns like Kyaukme and Hsipaw<\/strong>, is in question. These issues raise broader concerns about the sustainability of its gains.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, speculation has emerged that, unlike MNDAA\u2014which publicly agreed to a ceasefire\u2014TNLA may attempt to avoid reputational damage<\/strong> by quietly retreating<\/strong> from conflict zones under the guise of defensive repositioning. This is prompting theories of behind-the-scenes deals or understandings.<\/p>\n

The dramatic momentum of Operation 1027 in northern Shan has slowed. Whether TNLA and other forces can retain their current territories increasingly depends on the geopolitical calculations<\/strong> and strategic designs of neighboring China<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0 “Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 June 8 View” (MoeMaKa, June 9, 2025): TNLA Gradually Retreating from Held Territories Under Chinese Pressure As relations between China and Myanmar\u2019s military junta have improved, ethnic armed groups based in northern Shan State and…<\/p>\n

Read more →<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6411,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[9,58],"tags":[100],"class_list":["post-6410","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-current","category-features","tag-myanmar-spring-revolution"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/image-2.png","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p3RDLm-1Fo","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6410","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6410"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6410\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6412,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6410\/revisions\/6412"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6411"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6410"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6410"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6410"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}