{"id":5995,"date":"2025-05-07T10:40:57","date_gmt":"2025-05-07T04:10:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=5995"},"modified":"2025-05-07T10:40:57","modified_gmt":"2025-05-07T04:10:57","slug":"the-possibility-of-building-alliances-to-withstand-chinese-pressure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/05\/the-possibility-of-building-alliances-to-withstand-chinese-pressure\/","title":{"rendered":"The Possibility of Building Alliances to Withstand Chinese Pressure"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

“Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 May 5 Overview”<\/strong>,<\/p>\n

published by MoeMaKa on May 6, 2025<\/em>*:<\/p>\n

\n

The Possibility of Building Alliances to Withstand Chinese Pressure<\/strong><\/h3>\n

On May 4<\/strong>, the Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)<\/strong> held a press briefing<\/strong> regarding its April 28\u201329 meeting with the Myanmar military junta<\/strong> in Kunming, Yunnan Province<\/strong>, facilitated under Chinese pressure<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

At the press conference, TNLA publicly disclosed what both sides had demanded during the talks.<\/p>\n

According to their account, the junta requested TNLA<\/strong> to withdraw from all towns it had seized during Operation 1027<\/strong>, including Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Naungcho, Mogok, Moemate, Namkham, and Kutkai<\/strong>, and to station its forces only in Namhsan and Mantong<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

Strategic and Economic Dimensions<\/strong><\/h3>\n

TNLA captured 12 towns<\/strong> during Operation 1027, including several in resource-rich regions<\/strong> like Mogok. Holding such towns not only strengthened their military influence<\/strong> but also became a source of revenue<\/strong>, particularly through taxation of local resources and trade.<\/p>\n

However, the fact that multiple armed groups control different stretches of the China\u2013Myanmar border trade route<\/strong> has led to Chinese dissatisfaction. Beijing reportedly signaled that if TNLA refused to withdraw, it may face border gate closures<\/strong>\u2014putting TNLA in a difficult position.<\/p>\n

\n

Signals of Pressure and Isolation<\/strong><\/h3>\n

While TNLA officially stated it has no current plans to withdraw<\/strong>, its tone suggests that partial withdrawals<\/strong> under pressure might be considered in the future.<\/p>\n

What makes this more serious is that among the Northern Brotherhood Alliance\u2019s three members<\/strong>, only two remain actively resisting<\/strong> the junta\u2014since MNDAA signed a ceasefire and returned Lashio in January<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

This leaves TNLA and AA (Arakan Army)<\/strong> to bear the full brunt of military resistance, intensifying pressure on them both.<\/p>\n

\n

Fraying Trust Within the Alliance<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The handover of Lashio has already damaged trust among alliance members and their PDF allies. During the first and second phases of Operation 1027, the three allied EAOs and PDF units<\/strong> had carried out joint offensives\u2014something unprecedented in the Spring Revolution.<\/p>\n

But the return of Lashio was seen as undermining the momentum<\/strong> and compromising future coordination<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

China\u2019s Broader Aim: Full Border Stability<\/strong><\/h3>\n

There is speculation that China now seeks the complete withdrawal of ethnic armed groups from the trade corridor<\/strong> running from Muse and Lashio to Mandalay. TNLA has not confirmed this, but media speculation suggests this is part of Beijing\u2019s strategy.<\/p>\n

In that context, TNLA\u2019s press briefing appears to be a strategic move to signal to other ethnic forces<\/strong>\u2014such as KIA, MNDAA, SSPP, and RCSS<\/strong>\u2014that unity is essential<\/strong> to resist Chinese pressure.<\/p>\n

Among these groups:<\/p>\n