{"id":5893,"date":"2025-04-30T02:36:02","date_gmt":"2025-04-29T20:06:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=5893"},"modified":"2025-04-30T02:36:02","modified_gmt":"2025-04-29T20:06:02","slug":"after-the-return-of-lashio-mounting-pressure-on-tnla","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/04\/after-the-return-of-lashio-mounting-pressure-on-tnla\/","title":{"rendered":"After the Return of Lashio: Mounting Pressure on TNLA"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

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“Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 April 28 Overview”<\/strong>, published by MoeMaKa<\/em> on April 29, 2025:<\/p>\n

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After the Return of Lashio: Mounting Pressure on TNLA<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Following the MNDAA’s ceasefire agreement with the junta in January and their handover of Lashio<\/strong> in April, there is now growing pressure on other armed groups<\/strong> in northern Shan State, particularly the TNLA (Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army)<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

During late 2023 and early 2024, the rapid collapse of junta positions\u2014military bases and towns\u2014in northern Shan surprised not only the junta but also many political and military observers. As losses mounted in Rakhine and northern Shan, the junta faced serious doubts about its survival, while the resistance forces experienced a surge in morale.<\/p>\n

However, the January ceasefire agreement<\/strong> between the MNDAA and the junta, followed by the handover of Lashio<\/strong>, has cooled the momentum<\/strong> of further territorial advances and damaged solidarity among allied resistance groups.<\/p>\n

The MNDAA’s decision effectively signals that it no longer intends to expand territory<\/strong>, and the junta can concentrate its military resources<\/strong> elsewhere\u2014particularly against the TNLA.<\/p>\n

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TNLA Under Renewed Pressure<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Over recent weeks, fighting around Taung Kham<\/strong> south of Naungcho has intensified. The junta\u2019s forces, previously in defensive positions, have now shifted to offensive operations<\/strong>, gradually advancing toward Naungcho.<\/p>\n

Reports indicate junta forces have captured villages such as Meibot<\/strong> and Naung Lin<\/strong> near Taung Kham, bringing them within 15\u201316 miles<\/strong> of Naungcho town.<\/p>\n

Given that the junta reclaimed Lashio without a fight<\/strong>, it is now likely to target Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw<\/strong> for recapture in a step-by-step campaign.<\/p>\n

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The Junta’s Strategy in Northern Shan<\/strong><\/h3>\n

While the junta continues defensive retreats<\/strong> in Rakhine, the Irrawaddy Delta, and Bhamo (Kachin State), in northern Shan, it appears to be attempting a counteroffensive<\/strong>\u2014using Chinese diplomatic cover and support.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s growing involvement suggests that the junta will focus on regaining key trade routes and towns along the Myanmar-China border<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

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TNLA\u2019s Difficult Position<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Since the start of Operation 1027, the TNLA has expanded its territory significantly, controlling areas not only populated by Ta’ang communities but also mixed regions like Kutkai, Naungcho, and Mogok<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

However, as the balance of forces shifts\u2014with less backup from the MNDAA and BPLA\u2014TNLA\u2019s position is now more precarious. Tensions have also been reported between different ethnic groups in newly captured territories, reducing unity compared to the early stages of Operation 1027.<\/p>\n

The presence and cooperation of PDFs (People’s Defense Forces) from Sagaing, Mandalay, and southern Shan, which were prominent during earlier battles in places like Kwanlon and Laukkai<\/strong>, now seem less certain.<\/p>\n

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Fragmented Resistance?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Questions are now being raised:<\/p>\n