{"id":5882,"date":"2025-04-29T03:27:40","date_gmt":"2025-04-28T20:57:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=5882"},"modified":"2025-04-29T03:30:03","modified_gmt":"2025-04-28T21:00:03","slug":"from-territory-loss-to-counteroffensive-juntas-rebound-and-the-resistances-need-for-unity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2025\/04\/from-territory-loss-to-counteroffensive-juntas-rebound-and-the-resistances-need-for-unity\/","title":{"rendered":"From Territory Loss to Counteroffensive: Junta’s Rebound and the Resistance’s Need for Unity"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

“Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 April 27 Overview”<\/strong>,<\/p>\n

published by MoeMaKa<\/em> on April 28, 2025:<\/p>\n

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From Territory Loss to Counteroffensive: Junta’s Rebound and the Resistance’s Need for Unity<\/strong><\/h3>\n

After the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG)<\/strong> in April 2021<\/strong>, the People\u2019s Defense Forces (PDFs)<\/strong> were established about a month later. The NUG, built upon the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)<\/strong> along with representatives from other revolutionary groups, ethnic organizations, and strike committees under the NUCC (National Unity Consultative Council)<\/strong>, quickly expanded its resistance framework.<\/p>\n

Nearly four years later<\/strong>, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and NUG-aligned PDFs now control around 90 townships<\/strong> and large swaths of territory. However, of Myanmar\u2019s 330 townships<\/strong>, more than 200<\/strong> remain under junta control<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

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The Impact of Operation 1027<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Following the launch of Operation 1027<\/strong> on October 27, 2023<\/strong>, resistance forces captured numerous towns, army bases, and key border trade routes. In Northern Shan State, the junta\u2019s movements were effectively blocked.<\/p>\n

In the second phase<\/strong> of Operation 1027, the resistance gained even more ground, dealing the junta heavy defeats on the eastern, northwestern, and northern fronts.<\/p>\n

However, China’s growing concerns over its regional interests\u2014fearing either total junta collapse or fragmentation\u2014led Beijing to pressure Myanmar’s armed groups toward a ceasefire<\/strong>, altering the political and military landscape.<\/p>\n

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The Shifting Dynamics<\/strong><\/h3>\n

It remains unclear whether the Northern Brotherhood Alliance<\/strong> foresaw China\u2019s policy shift. Some analysts believe China initially supported Operation 1027 to suppress border instability but grew alarmed when the ethnic forces gained too much power.<\/p>\n

While the first phase<\/strong> of Operation 1027 was partly justified as a \u201ccrackdown on illegal activities,\u201d the second phase<\/strong> evolved into a broader territorial conquest campaign<\/strong>, culminating in the capture of Lashio<\/strong>\u2014a move that triggered China’s diplomatic intervention.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s pressure eventually led to ceasefire negotiations and the handover of Lashio back to the junta<\/strong>, signifying a critical turning point<\/strong> in the campaign.<\/p>\n

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The Junta\u2019s Counteroffensive<\/strong><\/h3>\n

With support from China, the junta began regaining its footing<\/strong>:<\/p>\n