{"id":4648,"date":"2024-09-19T21:07:24","date_gmt":"2024-09-19T14:37:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=4648"},"modified":"2024-09-19T21:07:24","modified_gmt":"2024-09-19T14:37:24","slug":"what-is-the-background-behind-the-mndaas-september-4th-statement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2024\/09\/what-is-the-background-behind-the-mndaas-september-4th-statement\/","title":{"rendered":"What is the background behind the MNDAA’s September 4th statement?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Myanmar Spring Chronicle – September 18th Scene<\/p>\n

(MoeMaKa) September 19, 2024<\/p>\n

What is the background behind the MNDAA’s September 4th statement?<\/strong><\/p>\n

On September 18th, the Kokang armed group\u2019s propaganda Facebook page, “Kokang News Agency,” published a statement issued on September 4th by the military committee of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), officially titled \u201cStatement on the Current State of the Nation.\u201d<\/p>\n

The main points in the statement were that MNDAA\u2019s political stance, aimed at achieving genuine self-administration, would not change. Contrary to some assumptions, they clarified that they do not aim to secede from the country, seize power, or establish a new independent state after gaining freedom.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the MNDAA stated that they would not form alliances, cooperate, or engage with foreign entities opposed to China or Myanmar, marking these as political red lines. In addition, they emphasized that they would not collaborate with the NUG (National Unity Government) or expand the battlefield to attack Mandalay and Taunggyi, instead maintaining a stance of self-defense.<\/p>\n

The third point appealed for China to intervene and mediate the increasingly worsening situation in Myanmar. MNDAA expressed that they would cease military operations and seek a political solution through active cooperation and dialogue to resolve conflicts.<\/p>\n

This statement seems to reflect the path China desires and exerts pressure towards, something not easily denied. Some speculate that China may have supported Operation 1027, launched previously, though concrete evidence for such claims is lacking. Operation 1027 was initially aimed at cracking down on online fraud syndicates run by Chinese nationals in the Kokang region, adjacent to China’s border, aligning with China’s interests. It also demonstrated the necessity of China\u2019s support in the crackdown. The current statement seems to indicate MNDAA\u2019s intention to maintain a course that avoids conflicting with China’s interests.<\/p>\n

MNDAA’s reaffirmation of its goal for genuine self-administration, along with assurances that they do not intend to pursue confederation or other more ambitious goals, seems to communicate to China that they have no further aspirations. Given their control of key strategic towns and regions of economic importance, MNDAA may now focus on holding these territories rather than expanding their aims.<\/p>\n

However, the wording of the statement, specifically using the term “state,” is somewhat ambiguous as it does not clarify whether it refers to Myanmar. Since they refrained from explicitly mentioning “Myanmar,” it is assumed they refer to the Union of Myanmar. The term \u201cseizing state power\u201d seems to suggest they are referring to the military junta currently controlling Myanmar\u2019s power.<\/p>\n

The second point\u2014stating that MNDAA would not form alliances or engage with foreign entities opposing China or Myanmar\u2014indicates a political red line. By also distancing itself from the NUG, and affirming that they will not collaborate with the NUG in military or political matters, nor join in attacks on Mandalay and Taunggyi, the statement hints at a view of the NUG as a Western-aligned entity that opposes China\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n

It is hard to say whether this position will be practically implemented or is merely a response to pressure from China. However, the statement may have significant impact, pledging MNDAA\u2019s non-involvement in attacks on Mandalay and Taunggyi, while leaving the possibility open for other allied northern groups to participate. Even if MNDAA refrains from direct involvement, speculations exist that they may still provide arms or forces under a different guise.<\/p>\n

The third and final point invites China\u2019s mediation, reinforcing that MNDAA will not act against China’s interests, reaffirming their alignment with China\u2019s objectives.<\/p>\n

This declaration could significantly disrupt the unity among the anti-junta forces and shows the increasing pressure on regions or organizations with ties to China to accept ceasefire and political dialogue under China\u2019s influence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Myanmar Spring Chronicle – September 18th Scene (MoeMaKa) September 19, 2024 What is the background behind the MNDAA’s September 4th statement? On September 18th, the Kokang armed group\u2019s propaganda Facebook page, “Kokang News Agency,” published a statement issued on September…<\/p>\n

Read more →<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4649,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[9,58],"tags":[100],"class_list":["post-4648","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-current","category-features","tag-myanmar-spring-revolution"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/09\/signal-2024-09-18-215956_002.jpeg","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p3RDLm-1cY","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4648","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4648"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4648\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4650,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4648\/revisions\/4650"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4649"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4648"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4648"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4648"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}