{"id":10450,"date":"2026-11-15T21:24:41","date_gmt":"2026-11-15T14:54:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=10450"},"modified":"2026-11-15T21:24:41","modified_gmt":"2026-11-15T14:54:41","slug":"the-arakan-armys-pledge-to-capture-the-remaining-military-controlled-towns-in-rakhine-state-prospects-and-challenges","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2026\/11\/the-arakan-armys-pledge-to-capture-the-remaining-military-controlled-towns-in-rakhine-state-prospects-and-challenges\/","title":{"rendered":"The Arakan Army\u2019s Pledge to Capture the Remaining Military-Controlled Towns in Rakhine State: Prospects and Challenges"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><a href=\"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"450\" src=\"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10451\" srcset=\"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15.png 800w, https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15-300x169.png 300w, https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15-560x315.png 560w, https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15-260x146.png 260w, https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15-160x90.png 160w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/><\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2014 November 14 Perspective<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">(MoeMaKa), November 15, 2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Arakan Army\u2019s Pledge to Capture the Remaining Military-Controlled Towns in Rakhine State: Prospects and Challenges<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On November 13, marking the third anniversary of the resumption of fighting in Rakhine State on November 13, 2023, the Arakan Army (AA) announced that it would soon hand over the three remaining towns under Myanmar military control to the people of Rakhine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The three towns are Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State; Kyaukphyu, the starting point of China\u2019s oil and natural gas pipelines; and Manaung. While Manaung is relatively less significant in terms of strategic importance and economic investment, Kyaukphyu and Sittwe are both strategically and economically important cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over the past three years, the AA has captured 14 of Rakhine State\u2019s 17 townships. In addition, it has seized certain territories in Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway regions bordering Rakhine State, establishing buffer zones and extending its military front lines beyond Rakhine\u2019s boundaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The AA is not a member of the Spring Revolution Coordination and Engagement Forum (SCEF), in which the National Unity Government (NUG) plays a leading role. Instead, it maintains its affiliations with alliances such as the Northern Alliance and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), which include ethnic armed organizations from northern and northeastern Myanmar that supported the AA during its establishment and subsequent development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At present, no one can provide a definitive answer as to how long it might take the AA to capture Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung\u2014or whether it will ultimately succeed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Some Rakhine-based news outlets, as well as other Myanmar media organizations, frequently report on the AA\u2019s military successes and the losses suffered by the military authorities that seized power in the 2021 coup. These reports generally portray the AA as enjoying a military advantage, while the Myanmar military is depicted as suffering declining morale and repeated battlefield setbacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, as is common in warfare, parties to a conflict often conduct psychological operations and disseminate propaganda intended to boost the morale of their own forces and supporters while undermining that of their opponents. Consequently, not every claim made in wartime announcements can be accepted as an accurate reflection of conditions on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The familiar saying that \u201cthe first casualty of war is truth\u201d remains relevant. In pursuit of victory, warring parties may distribute information that combines truth with falsehood or circulate misleading claims that are difficult to verify, seeking to gain an advantage in the information war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This does not mean that all reports about fighting, civilian casualties, and attacks in Rakhine State should be dismissed. Rather, such information needs to be carefully examined and independently verified before being accepted as credible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, one undeniable fact is that, since 2021, the AA has captured a greater proportion of its claimed territory and a larger number of towns than any other ethnic armed organization in Myanmar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A few months ago, a United States-based research organization reportedly assessed the AA as the largest and most militarily capable non-state armed group in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are relatively few Southeast Asian countries experiencing internal armed conflicts involving non-state armed organizations. Such groups are found primarily in the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia. Compared with the AA in Myanmar, the non-state armed groups operating in the other three countries are considerably smaller in military strength.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Myanmar has struggled with civil war for more than 70 years, approaching eight decades. Yet among the country\u2019s non-state armed organizations, the AA, which has existed for only a little over a decade, has emerged as one of the most powerful, surpassing many organizations with much longer histories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under successive Myanmar governments, Rakhine State has remained one of the country\u2019s least developed regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although the state possesses natural resources, including coastal fisheries and offshore natural gas deposits, it has lacked efficient transportation infrastructure for trade and communication with other parts of the country. Successive Union governments also failed to implement major development projects in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a result, Rakhine remained economically underdeveloped for decades, even during periods when it was relatively free from armed conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The AA had already been conducting significant military operations in Rakhine State before the 2021 military coup.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Intense fighting took place during 2018 and 2019. The AA gradually strengthened its position through successive military offensives, informal ceasefire arrangements, and periods of regrouping and reinforcement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the 2021 coup, the AA pursued military operations aimed at freeing Rakhine State from Myanmar military control. After another temporary ceasefire before November 2023, the organization resumed its offensives and subsequently captured extensive territories in rapid succession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although it remains difficult to predict how a future federal union of Myanmar might be structured, AA commander General Tun Myat Naing stated in a media interview several years ago that the AA envisioned at least a confederate-level status for Rakhine State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By the third anniversary of the military operations launched on November 13, 2023, the AA had reportedly established control over approximately 90 percent of Rakhine State\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite these territorial gains, however, there has been no visible indication of de facto engagement or communication between the AA and neighboring Bangladesh or India, which borders southern Chin State, including areas under AA control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">More than one million Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh for approximately nine years. Some individuals with experience in Bangladeshi politics and public administration have publicly suggested that resolving the refugee crisis will require engagement with the AA, which currently controls northern Rakhine State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, the Bangladeshi government has not, as of now, established visible direct engagement with the AA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Similarly, India wishes to complete the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which is intended to facilitate the movement of goods through Paletwa and Kyauktaw to the Sittwe river estuary. However, India has not yet undertaken visible direct engagement with the AA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At present, the AA possesses several important military advantages. These include its extensive territorial control, its ability to establish buffer zones beyond Rakhine State, and its capacity to extend the front lines into neighboring regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Its principal weakness, however, remains its inability to effectively prevent or defend against airstrikes carried out by Myanmar\u2019s military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Against this backdrop, there is also speculation that the AA might eventually use its current military advantages as leverage to enter negotiations with Myanmar\u2019s military authorities under certain circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The question, therefore, is not merely whether the AA can capture the three remaining military-controlled towns in Rakhine State, but also how its military gains might shape the region\u2019s political future and whether those gains could eventually become the basis for negotiations.<br><br><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2014 November 14 Perspective (MoeMaKa), November 15, 2026 The Arakan Army\u2019s Pledge to Capture the Remaining Military-Controlled Towns in Rakhine State: Prospects and Challenges On November 13, marking the third anniversary of the resumption of fighting in&hellip;<\/p>\n<p class=\"more-link-p\"><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2026\/11\/the-arakan-armys-pledge-to-capture-the-remaining-military-controlled-towns-in-rakhine-state-prospects-and-challenges\/\">Read more &rarr;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":10451,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_hide_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_featured_image_duplicate_dismissed":0,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[9,58],"tags":[100],"class_list":["post-10450","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-current","category-features","tag-myanmar-spring-revolution"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p3RDLm-2Iy","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-15.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10450","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10450"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10450\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10452,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10450\/revisions\/10452"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10451"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10450"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10450"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10450"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}