{"id":10312,"date":"2026-10-22T15:04:22","date_gmt":"2026-10-22T08:34:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/?p=10312"},"modified":"2026-10-22T15:04:22","modified_gmt":"2026-10-22T08:34:22","slug":"the-myanmar-militarys-offensives-and-the-battlefronts-where-it-faces-resistance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/2026\/10\/the-myanmar-militarys-offensives-and-the-battlefronts-where-it-faces-resistance\/","title":{"rendered":"The Myanmar Military\u2019s Offensives and the Battlefronts Where It Faces Resistance"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from October<\/em> 21<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

(MoeMaKa), October 22, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Myanmar Military\u2019s Offensives and the Battlefronts Where It Faces Resistance<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Myanmar military, which seized power on February 1, 2021, found itself facing renewed attacks from several ethnic armed organizations just months after the coup. These included groups that had not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), as well as some that had signed it. Fighting resumed between these organizations and the forces of the military regime, which called itself the State Administration Council (SAC).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, young people from towns and regions outside the traditional ethnic minority areas, who opposed the military takeover, traveled to territories controlled by ethnic armed organizations to receive military training and weapons. They subsequently formed People\u2019s Defense Forces (PDFs) in towns and surrounding areas across the country and launched armed resistance against the military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military had arrested the leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the civilian government following the NLD\u2019s victory in the 2020 general election. However, it apparently had not anticipated encountering such widespread armed resistance. Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing acknowledged this unexpected development in a speech delivered shortly after the takeover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Based on the historical experience following the 1988 military coup, when students and young people sought refuge with ethnic armed organizations and took up arms against the military, the generals may have expected resistance on a limited scale. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that they did not anticipate an armed conflict spreading across virtually the entire country to the extent seen today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the time of the 2021 coup, many ethnic armed organizations had already signed the NCA, while others, despite not being signatories, had reached ceasefire arrangements with the military. It is reasonable to assume that the military took these circumstances into account when deciding to overthrow the elected NLD government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reality, however, turned out very differently from what the generals had expected. Armed resistance emerged on a massive scale. Beyond the established ethnic armed organizations, numerous local resistance forces were formed, particularly in Myanmar\u2019s central Dry Zone, where they eventually gained control over significant territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military\u2019s promises to hold another election also became increasingly irrelevant to the resistance movement. Armed groups began launching campaigns to capture towns and territories, pursuing the objective of permanently removing the military from political power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three years ago, on October 27, 2023, three ethnic armed organizations in northeastern Myanmar launched coordinated attacks under Operation 1027. Within a few months, they captured extensive territories that had remained under military control for decades. Thousands of military personnel surrendered, dealing the armed forces a series of deeply humiliating defeats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Operation 1027 unfolded in northern Shan State, other resistance forces opened additional fronts elsewhere in the country. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) launched major operations, while in Karenni (Kayah) State, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) began offensives a little more than two weeks after Operation 1027 commenced. These simultaneous campaigns placed the military under enormous pressure, leaving it struggling to respond to multiple crises at once.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response, the military activated the conscription law and began recruiting approximately 5,000 new soldiers each month. It also accelerated training in drone warfare and acquired additional equipment, making intensive efforts to prevent further territorial losses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking back from early 2024 to the closing months of 2026, several developments stand out. The military managed to secure ceasefire agreements with certain ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State through Chinese mediation and pressure. It also rapidly learned to employ evolving drone technologies and integrated them extensively into its military operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, some ethnic armed organizations increasingly focused on consolidating the territories they had captured and establishing administrative structures rather than pursuing a nationwide military victory over the junta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This shift in priorities became one of the factors that diminished the prospects for another rapid, large-scale territorial offensive comparable to Operation 1027.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, tensions emerged among some ethnic armed organizations over territorial control, taxation, and the authority to recruit soldiers. These disputes created additional friction within the broader armed resistance landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against this backdrop, the military developed a strategy aimed at recovering territory by prioritizing areas and routes that generate revenue, provide access to natural resources, or serve important commercial and transportation functions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Its operations increasingly focused on disrupting border trade, cutting transportation corridors connecting different regions, and targeting resource-rich areas. Where possible, the military sought to capture these locations; where it could not, it prioritized disrupting or destroying them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through these operations, the military succeeded in recapturing some territory in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Chin State, and Karen State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Examining the major battlefronts where intense fighting has continued throughout 2026, several areas stand out. These include three fronts along the borders of Rakhine State; the cities of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu within Rakhine State; Bhamo in Kachin State; parts of Myawaddy Township in Karen State; and the interconnected border areas of Magway Region, Sagaing Region, and Chin State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At present, the most intense fighting is taking place inside Rakhine State, along its borders, and around Bhamo in Kachin State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the military leadership appears to recognize that recapturing the entirety of Rakhine State would be extremely difficult, it seems determined to commit all available resources to offensive operations aimed at recovering at least part of the territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military\u2019s apparent objectives are twofold: first, to prevent the Arakan Army, which controls most of Rakhine State, from expanding its territorial gains any further; and second, to pressure the AA into entering negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To achieve these objectives, the military has been conducting attacks using air, naval, and ground forces. The scale and variety of these operations make its intentions increasingly apparent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, the battle for Bhamo in Kachin State has continued for nearly two years. The city\u2019s strategic location and symbolic importance have made it a particularly significant battlefield. As a result, substantial military forces have been committed to prolonged fighting over control of the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the military regime\u2019s current strategy will be tested on two critical fronts: Rakhine State and Kachin State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The outcomes of these intense battles will provide important indications of whether the military can regain the initiative and recover lost territory, or whether resistance forces can maintain their positions against renewed offensives.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Myanmar Spring Chronicle \u2013 Scenes from October 21 (MoeMaKa), October 22, 2026 The Myanmar Military\u2019s Offensives and the Battlefronts Where It Faces Resistance The Myanmar military, which seized power on February 1, 2021, found itself facing renewed attacks from several…<\/p>\n

Read more →<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":10313,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[9,58],"tags":[100],"class_list":["post-10312","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-current","category-features","tag-myanmar-spring-revolution"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p3RDLm-2Gk","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/image-18.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10312","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10312"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10312\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10314,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10312\/revisions\/10314"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10313"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10312"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10312"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/moemaka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10312"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}